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ABSTRACT 
 
The Stages of Nonprofit Advocacy. (December 2005) 
 
Jill Denise Nicholson-Crotty, B.A., Kansas State University; 
 
M.A., Colorado State University 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Kim Q. Hill 
 
 
This dissertation argues that advocacy is a two-stage decision in which 
organizations must first decide whether or not to undertake political activity through 
advocacy or lobbying and then choose between the set of strategic actions that, based on 
available financial and human resources, are available to them. These are separate 
decisions with separate constraints. The decision to advocate is a strategic stance taken 
by nonprofit organizations in policy environments that necessitate such activity and in 
which it is politically conducive for them to undertake the cost of such actions. Once an 
organization has decided that it will undertake advocacy activities, it must determine the 
specific activities, collaboration, grassroots advocacy, or direct lobbying, that will help it 
to pursue that course most effectively. 
These hypotheses are tested in an analysis of the advocacy activities of over 500 
nonprofit reproductive health service providers. Data for this study were gathered from 
the National Center for Charitable Statistics within the Urban Institute and directly from 
IRS Form 990s filed by the organizations. The findings suggest that there are strong and 
consistent relationships between policy and politics and the political activity of nonprofit 
service providers. In states with more restrictive reproductive health policy 
environments, nonprofit organizations that provide these services are more likely to 
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engage in advocacy activity. The findings also suggest that, even when controlling for 
the policy environment, 501(c)(3)s are more likely to become politically active in states 
where they have a larger number of political allies. Additional analyses suggest that 
there is a negative relationship between government monies and the aggressiveness of 
advocacy and the use of multiple advocacy strategies. Interestingly, this finding is 
consistent with the expectations offered in the resource dependence literature and the 
results suggest only a tenuous relationship between institutional variables and decisions 
regarding organizational aggressiveness in the choice of advocacy strategies. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Puzzle and Research Questions 
Groups classified by the Internal Revenue Service as 501(c)(3) organizations 
constitute what we traditionally think of as public charities. Contributions to these 
organizations are tax deductible because they have as their primary mission the delivery 
of services and support to citizens who are typically underserved by government and the 
market. In recent years, however, scholars of the voluntary and nonprofit sector have 
become increasingly interested in the instances when these organizations engage in 
advocacy, or overt political behavior, on behalf of their clients.  The growing scholarly 
interest in those instances when 501(c)(3)s advocate is largely the result of a recognition 
that these organizations often provide the only access to the political process for 
traditionally disenfranchised groups and have a substantive impact on the policy debate.  
Nonprofit organizations fill the widening gap between the needs of citizens and 
the resources available from government and the private sector, but they also play 
another key role in democratic societies. If and when charities become involved in the 
political process, they are representing a set of constituents that are among the most 
economically vulnerable and politically inefficacious groups in society (Berry 2003). 
These groups do not usually have the sophistication to understand their political options 
or the power to influence lawmakers directly. Additionally, they are not citizens who are  
____________ 
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typically mobilized by traditional membership organizations (Boris and Krehely 2002). 
Scholars suggest that this representation function may be one of the most important, but 
least well understood, roles played by the third sector in this country. 
Prior research suggests that politically active nonprofit organizations provide 
substantive as well as symbolic policy benefits to clients. In other words, when charities 
advocate, they not only give a political voice to traditionally disenfranchised groups. 
They also influence the policy debate in meaningful ways. Studies of both national and 
state legislatures indicate that aggressive and well funded 501(c)(3) organizations can 
command the attention of lawmakers (Berry 2003; Petrescu 2002). More importantly, 
the policy record indicates that the preferences of these groups (and their clients) are 
reflected in policy outputs. To name but a few examples, 501(c)(3) organizations were 
instrumental in getting the price of cigarettes increased in numerous states, compelled  
state lawmakers to change policies about the dissemination of reproductive health 
services in conservative states, and had a significant impact on local policies regarding 
violence against women and the battle against AIDS/HIV (American Cancer Society 
2004; Planned Parenthood Federation of America 1991; Minkoff 2002).  
Despite the important symbolic and substantive benefits of political activity by 
nonprofit organizations, recent evidence suggests that a relatively limited number of 
charities actively advocate. In a recent survey, only 19% of traditional 501(c)(3) 
nonprofit organizations claimed to be highly active testifying at legislative hearings or 
lobbying elected officials. Just over 30% claimed a high level of activity releasing 
reports to the media, educating citizens about policy, or encouraging citizens to sign 
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petitions or contact representatives (Berry 2003). The survey also indicates that charities 
which advocate often limit themselves to just one or two of the tactics available to them. 
Sixty percent of politically active NPOs limit their activity to affiliation with more 
traditional lobbying groups. A considerably smaller percentage participates in grass-
roots activities designed to change public opinion or attempts to directly influence policy 
by lobbying legislators (See Berry 2003). A marked minority of politically active groups 
(14%) count all of these activities among their repertoire of tactics.  
The fact that the scope of 501(c)(3) advocacy is relatively small despite the 
benefits that such activities bestow on clients has led many observers to ask why so few 
nonprofit organizations actively advocate on behalf of clients. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, authors have identified numerous constraints on the advocacy function in 
response to this question. They have focused on the growth in government/third sector 
partnerships and the resultant dependence of many NPOs on government funding as an 
explanation (Wolch 1990; Kramer 1985). They have also emphasized the institutional 
characteristics of nonprofit charities, which often make them hesitant to engage in 
political activity.  
Finally, scholars have emphasized the restrictions placed on NPO political 
activity by the existing tax code and the resultant ways nonprofit administrators perceive 
the potential costs of advocacy (Hopkins 1992; Berry, 2003: 41). The existing tax code 
does not prohibit political activity, but it does limit the type and quantity of such activity 
that an organization can engage in if it wants to retain its tax exempt status. 501(c)(3) 
organizations, to whom contributions are tax deductible, are prohibited from 
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participating in openly partisan activities such as endorsement of candidates, but they 
can attempt to influence public policy and opinion so long as spending on such activities 
remains below percentages of tax exempt revenue set by Congress (Hopkins 1992). 
Although certain political activities are legal under the current tax code, scholars 
suggest that there is, nonetheless, a “fear factor” surrounding advocacy (Berry, 2003: 
41). “Leaders of Washington-based organizations that promote nonprofits and offer 
training to nonprofit executives on government relations…heard a familiar story from 
nonprofit directors who indicated that they were afraid of doing anything that could 
resulting the loss of their tax deductibility” (Berry, 2003: 41). These nonprofit leaders 
realized that the tax code allowed for considerable more advocacy than the “rank-and-
file executive directors believed,” however, “they realized that the perception of the law 
could be far more influential that the letter of the law” (Berry, 2003: 41). Berry (2003) 
argues that executive directors of nonprofit service organizations perceive advocacy 
activity to be a threat to their tax exempt status as 501(c)(3) organizations. Because that 
exempt status is crucial to their ability to raise money, and ultimately to their survival, 
many of these organizations choose not to advocate or not to advocate aggressively 
rather than risk losing their exemption (Berry 2003; See also Wolch 1990; Kramer 
1985). In other words, these organizations respond to a powerful disincentive to lobby 
created by the tax code. 
So, while the existing literature on nonprofit advocacy may have adequately 
explained why so few charities are actively political, it has ignored a related and in some 
ways more foundational question. Namely, when do those organizations who become 
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politically active decide that the benefits to clients are great enough to justify the risks 
associated with advocacy? In other words, what motivates some individual charities to 
advocate despite documented constraints? The benefits to clients discussed above 
certainly offer a general answer to that question, but they do not allow for a specific 
empirical prediction concerning which NPOs will advocate and when.  
Assuming that the decision to engage in the policy debate is not one that these 
groups make lightly, a related question emerges. Namely, how do 501(c)(3) 
organizations choose among the tactics that they might employ in pursuit of the 
potentially costly goal of changing public policy? The literature on traditional interest 
groups suggests that these organizations are most effective when they employ a broad 
repertoire of strategies, rather than focusing on a more limited set of activities. Yet, 
research suggests that politically active charities often do the latter, with few 
organizations availing themselves of all available strategies. So, we are left with the 
question, what is it that constrains the choices that 501(c)(3) organizations make among 
advocacy activities?  
Shortcomings in the Existing Literature 
There exists a small but growing literature on the advocacy activities of nonprofit 
service providers. Authors have described trends in political activity among charities and 
provided a general outline of the scope and scale of these activities (Kramer 1994; Smith 
and Lipsky 1993; Wolch 1990; Salamon 1995; Sosin 1986; Boris and Krehely 2002). 
Scholars have attempted to explain the limited amount of political activity among 
charities. Speaking generally, these studies identify the tax code, funding diversity or 
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dependence, institutional structures and processes, and organizational capacity as the 
primary reasons why some 501(c)(3)s choose not to advocate. 
Although existing studies provide a foundation for the analysis of NPO 
advocacy, I argue that they do not satisfactorily answer the question posed above 
because of several key shortcomings.  First, advocacy activity by 501(c)(3)s is clearly 
intended to change policy in one fashion or another, yet existent studies do not treat the 
policy environment of these organizations as a key explanatory factor. A focus on the 
policy environment, I suggest, offers insight into why and when NPOs advocate, which 
we can add to existing knowledge concerning why they mostly do not.  
Finally, the existing literature, the tax code, and practitioner responses all suggest 
that there are a variety of strategies from which politically active nonprofits might 
choose. No study to date, however, has attempted to systematically understand the 
factors that influence the choice among these. Treating “advocacy” as a multifaceted, 
rather than a monolithic, activity should contribute to a more nuanced understanding of 
the ways in which charities fulfill their advocacy role. 
A Theory of Why and How 501(c)(3)s Advocate 
To address these shortcomings, this dissertation offers an alternative to existing 
explanations for nonprofit advocacy that focuses on the causes for, as well as the 
constraints on, this behavior. The theoretical framework incorporates the insights from 
past scholarship regarding the challenges facing charities that wish to become politically 
active, but also draws on other theoretical perspectives to develop expectations about 
how NPOs respond to their environments and make use of available resources. 
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Specifically, I argue that the decision to advocate is a strategic response to conditions in 
the policy environment in which NPOs deliver services, and that the content and 
character of that response are highly constrained by available resources.  
The theoretical framework for this dissertation draws heavily on open systems 
theories and theories of organizational strategy to develop the argument that NPOs set 
strategic goals in response to specific elements in the broader organizational 
environment. It relies on previous scholarship and the testimony of nonprofit managers 
to defend the assertion that existing public policy, those actions by government that 
constrain or facilitate the delivery of services, should be considered the key element that 
motivates the strategic choice to become politically active.  
Once an organization has made the choice to become politically active, it must 
select a set of tactics that it will use to pursue the goal of changing policy. This is the 
second crucial component of the advocacy equation. The framework for this dissertation 
draws from the literature on Social Movement Organizations, as well as research on the 
importance of slack resources in organizations, to develop expectations about the factors 
that influence 501(c)(3)s’ choices among advocacy tactics. Specifically, it suggests that 
the number and type of strategies employed by a politically active NPO depend heavily 
on the level and nature of the human and financial resources that  it possesses.  
Research Design for the Dissertation 
The unit of analysis in this study is the organization, and the models herein 
analyze the 501(c)(3) pro-choice reproductive health/family planning service providers 
that generate over $25,000 in annual revenue. I model the decision to advocate and the 
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choice among advocacy strategies by these groups as functions of the state-level political 
environment in which they deliver services and the organizational resources that they 
possess. Data on advocacy activities and organizational characteristics of family 
planning NPOs are drawn from tax records and a rich, but relatively under-utilized, 
dataset compiled by the National Center for Charitable Statistics. Finally, I test 
expectations about the decision to advocate and the choice of advocacy strategies using a 
quasi-experimental design. 
Because I argue that advocacy is a response to the policy environment, it is 
necessary to identify the specific policies that an NPO is concerned with. This 
necessitates the study of a specific type of provider to facilitate the identification of such 
policies, and I have chosen reproductive health/family planning providers for several 
reasons. First, because of the nature services they deliver, these organizations are often 
the focus of policymakers—both positive and negative. Thus, the actions of government 
are salient to these organizations. Additionally, I have chosen reproductive health/family 
planning organizations because they share environmental and organizational 
characteristics with other NPO service providers. 
I focus on the state-level political environment for a variety of reasons. First, 
state-level policies have the most meaningful impact on the ability of reproductive health 
providers to effectively serve clients (McFarlane and Meier 2001). Second, the literature 
on nonprofit advocacy argues that these groups focus a great deal of energy on state-
level policies because of their perceived efficacy at this level (Berry 2003; Boris and 
Krehely 2002). Finally, I choose to focus on state-level policy environments because of 
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their variability. Federal statutes limiting the delivery of reproductive health services 
affect service providers across the nation uniformly. Alternatively, states vary 
dramatically in the degree to which they restrict or facilitate the ability of reproductive 
health/family planning providers to deliver services. This variation is vital to testing for 
a relationship between policy and advocacy activities designed to change policy.  
The data for analyses of the decision to advocate and the choice among advocacy 
strategies by 501(c)(3) organizations are gathered from the National Center for 
Charitable Statistics for 2001. The National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) is 
the national repository of data on nonprofit organizations in the United States. Its Core 
Files and Digitized Data, which are the primary datasets used herein, are produced 
annually and compiled from information that nonprofit organizations report to the IRS, 
primarily on IRS Form 990 and Form 990’s Schedule A. These datasets contain 
extensive information on the advocacy expenditures of all NPOs that generate over 
$25,000 in revenue each year, as well as data on expenditure categories, revenue sources 
and totals, and monetary debt and other obligations. Scholars suggest that these data are 
well suited to the study of nonprofit advocacy (Krehely 2001). There are, however, some 
limitations to this data which will be thoroughly examined in subsequent chapters. 
These data and the variability in the policy environments of reproductive 
health/family planning 501(c)(3)s delivering services in different states allow for the use 
of a relatively strong research design. Previous studies of 501(c)(3) advocacy have 
employed primarily descriptive and exploratory designs that do not allow for inference 
to organizations outside the sample and do not control sufficiently for competing 
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explanations. This study will take advantage of the natural laboratory provided by the 
states for the study of advocacy. The analyses in Chapter IV will hold key sets of 
variables constant to discern whether NPOs that have similar resources and 
organizational characteristics vary in their probability of being politically active 
depending on the policy environment in which they deliver services. Chapter V will use 
a similar design to determine whether organizations delivering services in the same 
policy environment make different choices about tactics depending on the varying 
resources that they possess.   
Outline of the Dissertation 
The remainder of the dissertation will pursue the argument outlined in this 
introduction in the following fashion. Chapter II will review the existing literature on 
nonprofit organizations and advocacy, highlighting both its shortcomings and its 
usefulness for this project. It will also develop the theoretical argument that advocacy is 
a strategic response to the policy environment, the nature of which is constrained by 
organizational resources. 
Chapter III will offer a much expanded version of the research design presented 
in this chapter. The chapter will discuss and defend the advantages of the research 
design, as well as the use of reproductive health/family planning organizations in this 
study.  It will also provide extensive information on the data collected by the National 
Center for Charitable Statistics and its usefulness in studying the advocacy activities of 
nonprofit organizations.  
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Chapter IV is the first empirical chapter, and it offers tests for the effect of the 
policy and political environments on the decision to advocate by 501(c)(3) 
organizations. This chapter will summarize the reproductive health/family planning 
policy environments in the American states in an effort to clarify the political as well as 
policy issues that these nonprofit providers face. 501(c)(3) organizations delivering 
family planning and reproductive health services face a remarkably complex web of 
policies that both limit and facilitate their ability to serve clients. The chapter will 
describe the nature of these individual policies to give the reader a general conception of 
the policy environment. It will also introduce and describe a specific measure of 
environmental hostility/support based on the existence of policies targeting reproductive 
health family planning services. Finally, the chapter tests expectations regarding the 
impact of the policy environment against a model drawn from the existing literature, 
which emphasizes institutional characteristics and resource dependence as the primary 
determinants of advocacy. It does so in an analysis of the advocacy activity of all pro-
choice reproductive health/family planning 501(c)(3) organizations between 1998 and 
2001. 
Chapter V moves beyond the initial decision to advocate and addresses the 
choice among advocacy tactics by 501(c)(3) organizations. Before testing for the factors 
that influence these choices, the chapter explores, in depth, the advocacy strategies 
available to nonprofit organizations. These include collaboration with 501(c)(4) 
organizations/traditional interest groups, grassroots advocacy activities, and direct 
lobbying, each of which has financial and social costs associated with it. The chapter 
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operationalizes factors such as organizational slack, administrative capacity, and 
resource dependency, which theory suggests should affect NPOs’ decisions regarding 
whether or not they are able to bear these costs. Finally, it will test for the impact of 
these variables, as well as other relevant controls, on dependent variables measuring 
both the type and number of tactics included in a given organization’s advocacy 
portfolio. 
Definitions 
This section provides definitions for terminology that appears throughout the 
dissertation. First, when I speak of nonprofit service providers or family 
planning/reproductive health providers, I am referring only to those organizations 
classified by the Internal Revenue Service as 501(c)(3) organizations. These are 
organizations whose primary mission is service delivery and not lobbying, and whose 
advocacy activity is, therefore, closely monitored and regulated by the federal 
government. Organizations that are classified as 501 (c)(3) charities, which include 
religious, scientific, education, and literary organizations, are considered public benefit 
organizations or charities and cannot spend more than twenty percent of tax exempt 
contributions on advocacy activities.  The tax code does, however, allow unrestricted 
affiliations with 501 (c)(4) organizations for the purpose of engaging in political and 
lobbying activity. 
In this study, I examine only those 501 (c)(3) reproductive health service 
providers that cannot be explicitly identified as pro-life organizations. The method for 
identifying these organizations and the repercussions for the findings that arise from the 
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potential inclusion of a limited number of pro-life organizations in the sample will be 
discussed in Chapters III and IV. 
Generally speaking, I define advocacy, as do most other scholars in this area, as 
the public expression and representation of interests and concerns, which focuses on 
changing policies and securing collective goods (Jenkins 1987; Salamon 1994; Berry 
2003). I also draw distinctions, however, between the different advocacy strategies that 
groups might pursue, including grassroots lobbying, directly lobbying government, or 
collaboration with overtly political groups. I rely heavily on Reid (1999) for the 
following definitions of the latter strategies.  
Grassroots lobbying is an attempt to influence policy by changing public opinion 
and includes the dissemination of political materials and activities designed to garner 
public support. Alternatively, direct lobbying activities are targeted at city, state, and 
national elected officials in an effort to compel them to take actions that benefit the 
client groups of the nonprofit organizations.  Finally, collaboration is defined as mutual 
agreements and exchanges of aid between service providers and organizations with 
similar missions or with missions targeted at protecting and benefiting the clients that the 
NPO serves. This activity often includes affiliating with 501 (c)(4) organizations, which 
are allowed to participate in direct lobbying without limitation. 
The final terms that are to be defined here are risk and uncertainty. This chapter 
has introduced the idea that political activity poses at least a perceived risk to the 
survival of 501(c)(3) organizations. In this study, risk is defined as the degree to which 
an activity has a nontrivial probability of producing a state of the world which the 
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organization considers worse than the status quo. Although advocacy is intended to 
improve the delivery of services by improving the policy environment, it may result in 
the loss of tax exempt status or have other consequences which instead detract from the 
organization’s ability to deliver services.  
Subsequent chapters will make the argument that there is also considerable 
uncertainty that accompanies advocacy activities by 501(c)(3)s. I define uncertainty as 
the degree to which the organization cannot accurately ascribe with certainty the 
probability of the potential outcome of an action. Again relating this to the specific 
context herein, nonprofit organizations may undertake significant lobbying without 
being able to accurately predict the potential change in legislative behavior. Similarly, it 
is arguable that nonprofit organizations will have a difficult time predicting the change 
in public opinion that may arise from grassroots advocacy activities. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
The previous chapter suggested two questions concerning advocacy by 501(c)(3) 
organizations. Namely, what are the factors that motivate these groups to become 
politically active despite existing constraints and what are the organizational and policy 
environment characteristics that correlate with the choice of different advocacy tactics? 
To begin answering these questions, this chapter will first review the existing literature 
on nonprofit advocacy.  
Scholars from almost all of the social sciences have studied the roles played by 
nonprofit organizations. The study of nonprofit advocacy has been relatively limited 
when compared to the burgeoning scholarship on other components of the third sector, 
but it has also been undertaken in a variety of scholarly disciplines and from a variety of 
theoretical perspectives. The first section of this review will focus on scholarship 
primarily by public administration scholars, sociologists, and economists. The second 
section will focus first on the limited body of work found in political science.  
Along with reviewing previous scholarship, the purpose of this chapter is to 
highlight the omissions in the literature on nonprofit advocacy that leave it unable to 
satisfactorily answer the questions posed at the outset of this dissertation. The final 
section of this chapter will offer a framework for studying nonprofit advocacy that 
addresses these omissions and provides a more detailed and comprehensive picture of 
this important activity. 
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Literature Review 
Numerous scholars from sociology, public administration, and economics have 
investigated nonprofit advocacy without explicitly asking the question, what motivates 
NPOs to advocate. Scholars have debated whether the level of activity is increasing or 
decreasing over time (Kramer 1994; Smith and Lipsky 1993; Wolch 1990; Salamon 
1995; Sosin 1986). They have provided a general outline of the scope and scale of these 
activities (Boris and Krehely 2002) and documented the complex legal framework 
within which advocacy takes place (Hopkins 1992). Finally, they have investigated the 
effects of advocacy on policymaker perceptions (Petrescu 2002). 
Of primary concern for this dissertation, however, are those scholars who have 
explored the motivations for and the constraints on nonprofit advocacy. Although such 
classification schemes are always somewhat simplistic, for the sake of parsimony the 
existing literature can be divided into roughly three categories.1 These include studies 
that identify advocacy as a “strategic choice” made by NPOs, those that explore the 
“institutional” correlates of advocacy activity, and those that focus on the importance of 
organizational resources in the advocacy decision. As I will demonstrate, much of this 
research offers largely apolitical explanations for the decisions of NPOs regarding 
political activity and treats “advocacy” as a monolithic strategy. 
A strategic choice perspective on nonprofit advocacy assumes that these 
organizations are capable of adapting to and altering events in the external environment 
(Ansoff 1979; Koteen, 1989: 108-109; Ring, 1989: 67). This perspective relies heavily 
                                                 
1 This schema applies primarily to those studies produced by scholars in sociology, economics, and public 
affairs. 
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on organizational leadership as a primary explanatory factor for organizational decisions 
concerning advocacy. If organizations do not advocate, it is because the failure of 
managers to align internal capabilities with external forces leaves them unable to counter 
environmental threats and exploit environmental opportunities (Hay 1990; Ring 1989).  
Successful strategic response to environmental conditions can take several forms. 
Authors suggest that organizations can, to a certain degree, select their environment 
(Miles 1982). They can also modify internal structures to better suit environmental 
demands (Kearns and Scarpino1994). Finally, strategic choice theorists suggest that 
organizations can adopt externally oriented strategies that help them to stabilize 
relationships in constantly changing environments (Koteen 1989). 
While they offer an intuitively appealing way to think about nonprofit political 
activity, studies employing a strategic choice perspective offer little guidance for 
accurately predicting advocacy among 501(c)(3) organizations. First, they offer few 
explanations for advocacy activity beyond “leadership capacity,” which is highly 
contextual and difficult to measure reliably across multiple organizations. Similarly, 
strategic choice theory emphasizes environmental change as a motivator for advocacy, 
but studies employing this perspective are unclear regarding specific occurrences in the 
environment that create the impetus for politically activity and the specific decision 
processes that nonprofit managers employ when assessing cues from their environments.  
It is the overall lack of conceptual clarity and specificity of the strategic choice 
perspective that limits its utility for this study. Assertions such as, “advocacy has a 
chance to flourish in organizations that find and sustain a fit between their advocacy 
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goals and the environment” (Cruz, 2001: 26) can provide a frame for exploratory 
research. They are not helpful, however, in generating specific testable hypotheses about 
advocacy decisions. 
Other scholars have adopted an “institutional” perspective on nonprofit advocacy 
activities. Institutional theory suggests that significant actors within an organization’s 
network such as funders, the public, state agencies, and professional associations, 
develop and enforce normative rules for organizational behavior. Because of the 
established roles of these actors in society, those norms tend to be relatively 
conservative. Close adherence to these rules increases the probability of survival and, 
thus, organizations that survive tend to be those that meet dominant social expectations. 
An institutional isomorphism may result, where persistent organizations become more 
moderate and homogenous through mimetic processes, state coercion, or adoption of 
professional norms (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). 
Arguments about mimetic processes suggest that an NPO will have a low 
likelihood of advocating unless organizations that it perceives to be successful and 
legitimate also advocate (Oliver 1991; Kramer 1994; Salamon 1995). The most 
commonly identified form of state coercion and regulation for NPOs is the tax code, 
which authors suggest intentionally reduces the willingness of tax exempt service 
providers to engage in political activity (Hopkins 1992 for a review). Scholars also 
suggest that larger, more well-established NPOs naturally become increasingly risk 
adverse and, thus, attempt to “buffer” themselves from outside scrutiny to the greatest 
degree possible by avoiding controversial activities (Bernstein 1991).  
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Finally, other authors assert that the increasing adoption of professional norms by 
nonprofit organizations and managers throughout this century has suppressed the 
advocacy mission of these organizations in favor of an increased focus on efficient 
service delivery (LuBove, 1965: 52-53; Withorn, 1984: 24; Hall, 1987: 13-14). 
According to Hall (1987), attempts to professionalize nonprofit organizations date from 
the 1970s. To improve the efficiency of service delivery, organizations emphasized the 
importance of professional managers. The professional managers, however, sought long-
term career goals and thus focused on efficiency to the detriment of advocating interests 
of members and clients (Hall, 1987: 15).  
In sum, institutional theories of advocacy behavior predict low levels of 
advocacy generally. More specifically, they lead to the expectation that advocacy will be 
carried out primarily by small and relatively nascent organizations that have not yet 
succumbed to institutional pressures that suppress the advocacy function. Additionally, 
institutional theories assume little agency for organizations relative to their 
environments. This assumption seemingly ignores the widely held expectation among 
systems theorists and strategic management scholars that organizations are influenced 
by, but also exercise influence on, their environments (Thompson 1967; Child 1972). 
Finally, institutional theories focus almost exclusively on the constraints on advocacy 
activity, rather than on the motivations for it. 
Along with strategic choice and institutional theories, there are studies that adopt 
a resource dependence explanation for nonprofit advocacy. From the resource 
dependence perspective, the dominant environmental constraint on the advocacy 
  
20
function is the threat that advocacy poses to the procurement of government funds (Cruz 
2001). This is an argument that has resurfaced in the literature on nonprofit 
organizations numerous times over the past 30 years. The first reference to resource 
dependence and its constraining influence on advocacy activity was in Beck (1970), who 
argued briefly that the desire for increased government contracts would force voluntary 
organizations to deemphasize their advocacy role.  
Manser (1974, 421) expands Beck’s discussion of advocacy and government 
funding and suggests that the “purchase of service” agreements that typify 
government/voluntary sector relations pose threats to the advocacy activity of the latter. 
He asserts “an agency’s freedom and effectiveness in social action or advocacy may be 
in inverse proportion to the amount of public money that it receives.” He went on to 
suggest that “the reluctance of those who avoid involvement (in advocacy) for fear of 
controversy is deplorable, and it is a disgrace that our national policy, laws and the 
regulations of the Internal Revenue Service should be a deterring and controlling factor” 
(Manser 1974, 426). Finally, Manser (1974, 427) provides testimony from local 
government officials who claimed that they were unable to “publicly expose the effects 
of a regressive public welfare policy because 80% of the budget comes from the welfare 
agencies.” 
Kramer (1985) reiterates Manser’s concerns and expands the argument 
concerning the threat that a growing dependence on government funding poses to 
voluntary sector advocacy. He suggests that voluntarism is being transformed into 
“vendorism,” where NPOs find their primary role to be the contracted providers of 
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government services. He traces the growing dependence on government funds as these 
organizations became increasingly involved in carrying out a public purpose. Most 
importantly, he suggests that this dependence produces a number of dysfunctional 
consequences, including “cooptation and dilution of advocacy activity,” as well as “loss 
of autonomy and…voluntaristic character because of increased bureaucratization and 
professionalization” (Kramer 1985, 380). He goes on to assert that the growing 
dependence on government funds has made advocacy a low priority among many NPOs.  
Finally, Wolch (1990) also emphasizes that growing dependence on government 
funding among voluntary organizations may constrain advocacy activity because, as 
public funding becomes more central to organizational survival, nonprofits become more 
acquiescent to the demands of government. Specifically, she argues that for an 
organization to continue receiving these needed funds “group output is likely to change 
toward direct services administered by professionals and away from advocacy and 
participation” (Wolch 1990, 207). She goes on to suggest that the risk of losing 
government funding will also change the character of advocacy activities for those 
groups that continue to have a public voice. She claims that “the deepening dependence 
of many organizations on contracts…is likely to dampen their ability to be critical of 
government policy” (Wolch 1990, 215). “Confrontational actions,” she asserts “may be 
minimized…in order that they are not perceived as biting the hand that feeds them” 
(Wolch 1990, 216). 
Like institutional theory, resource dependence theories of NPO advocacy 
produce the expectation of low overall advocacy activity. As more nonprofits become 
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involved in the delivery of government programs and services (vendorism in Kramer’s 
terminology), fewer organizations will be willing to challenge government policy. The 
advocacy function will be relegated to those rare organizations that have resisted 
government funding or managed to cultivate a diverse resource base. Indeed, one of the 
most important features of the resource dependence approach for the purposes of this 
study is the consistent assertion that advocacy is a risk because it may threaten much 
needed government resources. Again, this literature focuses almost exclusively on 
constraints on, rather than causes of, advocacy. 
Recent scholarship on nonprofit advocacy has attempted to integrate the various 
theories discussed herein. Although she does not test competing expectations in a social 
scientific sense, Cruz (2001) explores the usefulness of strategic response, institutional, 
and resource dependence theories for organizing responses gathered in in-depth 
interviews of 60 executive directors of human service organizations.   
Interestingly, her findings do not provide clear support for any of the dominant 
explanations of nonprofit advocacy. Even for Cruz’s (2001) exploratory study, strategic 
choice theory is too vague to produce concrete expectations. She does note, however, 
that the theory ignores or underestimates many of the constraints identified by subjects 
in her study. Alternatively, institutional theory focuses heavily on those constraints and 
leads to expectations that only small and unprofessional groups will advocate. Cruz 
finds, however, that some of the most politically active organizations in her sample are 
large, long-established, and highly professionalized. Finally, Cruz discovers that, among 
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the respondents in her study, the degree of dependence on government resources had 
little impact on their organizations’ decision to advocate.  
Scholars in political science have shown relatively little interest in 501(c)(3) 
organizations or nonprofits. Interest group scholars have long known that some of these 
groups participate in the policy process despite the restrictions placed upon their political 
activity (Berry 1977; Holbert 1975; Hrebnar and Scott 1982; Leech 1998). Despite that 
knowledge, the greatest concentration of scholarship has been on citizen groups 
operating in Washington, most of which are 501(c)(4) organizations and do not face any 
restrictions on political activity. Not surprisingly, these studies have focused primarily 
on lobbying techniques, effectiveness, and membership recruitment rather than on the 
motivations for and disincentives against lobbying (Vogel 1995; McFarland 1984; 
Rothenberg 1992; Shaiko 1999). 
The relative paucity of political science literature in this area is due to the 
predominant focus of interest group scholars on Washington politics and early evidence 
in the literature that nonprofits were not particularly important players in that arena. 
Studies by Scholzman and Tierney (1986) and Berry (1977) found that nonprofits were 
some of the least represented interests in Washington.2 More importantly, much of the 
policy impact of these groups is seen at the state and local levels of government and is 
missed, therefore, by a national focus (Berry 2003).  
Additionally, most interest group scholars define their unit of analysis in such a 
way that precludes a focus on 501(c)(3)s. Early scholars had a broader conception of 
                                                 
2 The number of nonprofits has grown by over 120% since these conclusions were reached, with 501(c)(3) 
organizations constituting the largest proportion of that increase. 
  
24
what they termed “pressure groups,” that might have a variety of functions as their 
primary mission (See Truman 1951), but modern scholars have narrowed the definition 
of interest groups in a way that limits the applicability to nonprofits. As an example, 
Hrebenar and Scott’s (1982, 4) influential work Interest Group Politics in America 
defines interest groups as those groups “that are almost totally free from legal restriction 
and focus mainly on the public law making phase of government.”3 Additionally, service 
oriented groups are dismissed as “generally nonpolitical and of little interest”(Hrebenar 
and Scott 1982, 4). 
Recent work in political science has, however, addressed the relative paucity of 
scholarship on nonprofits as interest groups. More importantly, it has begun to ask why 
these groups would lobby given the constraints that they face. Berry (2003) grounds his 
study in a survey of 593 executive directors of nonprofit organizations, including health 
and human services and public benefit groups, as well as organizations devoted to arts, 
education, environment, and other areas.  
The author found that these nonprofit directors perceived advocacy to be a risky 
activity and that the majority identified the tax code as the primary impediment to their 
advocacy activity (Berry, 2003; 41). Although the professional Washington lobbyists 
that Berry interviewed understood the true extent of advocacy that the tax code allows, 
the executive directors of nonprofit organizations around the nation typically did not. 
                                                 
3 See also Walker’s (1991: 4) interest in “functioning associations in the United States that are open to 
membership and concerned with some aspect of public policy at the national level.” Even those authors 
who have broadened their definition to include non-membership groups, such as corporations, have 
typically defined an interest group in such a way as to limit the applicability to 501(c)(3) groups (See 
Hrebenar and Thomas 1993; Gray and Lowery 1996). 
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Thus, those individuals who actually make the decisions concerning lobbying were 
afraid that it might affect their tax exempt status, which they identified as critical to the 
survival of their organizations. To these individuals, knowing that the IRS had 
investigated nonprofits that might be violating some portion of the tax code made them 
hesitant to undertake the risk of lobbying (Berry 2003; 41 and 72). 
Although he does not explicitly identify a theoretical frame for his argument, 
Berry (2003) relies on an institutional explanation for advocacy, where the tax code 
provides a serious disincentive to lobby for NPOs. He provides a great deal of evidence 
that a lack of accurate knowledge about the amount of allowable advocacy under the 
current tax code, as well as a healthy fear of violating some aspect of the law, suppresses 
the advocacy function in many NPOs. He goes on to suggest that organizations are more 
likely to advocate when they are better informed about the tax code and can, therefore, 
distinguish those activities that are allowed from those that are not. 
Interestingly, while the tax code is clearly an institutional explanation for 
advocacy, the remainder of Berry’s findings do not provide support for institutional 
explanations. Rather than advocacy being carried out by small and loosely organized 
groups with few normative ties to funders and professional organizations, the author 
argues that the opposite is true. Berry (2003) suggests that large organizations with 
sophisticated accounting capacity are more likely than small, less differentiated 
organizations to advocate because they can play a financial “shell game” that obscures 
the actual extent of lobbying. Additionally, his findings do not suggest that longstanding 
relationships with government suppress the advocacy function. Instead, he argues for a 
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mobilization effect where previous government-initiated contacts are an important 
predictor of further political activity by the nonprofit. Interestingly, Berry’s findings also 
suggest that resource dependence has little or no impact on the decision to lobby. 
Similar to the studies of NPO advocacy reviewed above, Berry’s (2003) study 
suggests that relatively few NPOs will choose to advocate. Contrary to the scholarship 
reviewed above, however, his work suggests that larger organizations and those that 
have an existing relationship with government should be most likely to advocate. 
Finally, like other authors in this area, Berry focuses primarily on the constraints faced 
by organizations that wish to advocate, rather than the causes for the advocacy function. 
In summary, the literature on nonprofit advocacy from political scientists, 
sociologists, and economists suggests a model that emphasizes organizational influences 
on the decision to advocate.4 Specifically, previous scholarship offers the expectation 
that an increased reliance on government grants will correlate with reduced advocacy 
activity by 501(c)(3) organizations. Additionally, the literature suggests that the size and 
professionalization of an organization will also influence political activity, although 
scholars disagree regarding the direction of the relationships that will exist with these 
variables. 
I suggest that the preceding explanations provide unsatisfying answers to the 
questions posed at the outset of this chapter because they ignore several key issues 
relevant to the study of advocacy. First, the literature consistently focuses on constraints 
rather than causes. Professionalization, resource dependence, and organizational size 
                                                 
4 The strategic choice perspective suggests that NPOs react to their environment, but does not provide 
enough specificity regarding environmental cues to generate an operational definition.  
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may explain why an NPO chooses not to advocate, but cannot tell us why a service 
provider would stray from its primary mission to become politically active.5 The 
inconsistent predictions produced by existing theories may arise because authors have 
failed to identify what motivates NPOs to advocate in the first place. Advocacy is, by 
definition, intended to change public policy (Hopkins 1992), so it seems logical that the 
policy environment may be a good place to begin looking for such a motivator. 
The existing literature cannot comprehensively explain nonprofit advocacy 
because it treats it, conceptually or empirically, as a singular activity. Berry (2003) is 
careful to describe different advocacy activities, including affiliation, grassroots, and 
direct lobbying, but he never models the choice among them as a function of 
administrative capacity, organizational wealth, mobilization, or any of the other 
predictors of advocacy that he identifies. Similarly, Cruz (2001) tests the explanatory 
power of institutional, resource dependence, and strategic choice theories of advocacy 
without ever questioning executive directors about how these factors influence the ways 
in which they choose among the various strategies available to them. Finally, the large 
literature which suggests that NPOs are hesitant to advocate because of their dependence 
on government funding never explores the ways in which different types of advocacy 
pose different threats to valuable government resources.  
Theory 
To address these shortcomings, this dissertation offers an alternative to existing 
explanations for nonprofit advocacy that focuses on the causes for, as well as the 
                                                 
5 The mixed empirical evidence also suggests that these explanations may not be able to provide an 
accurate picture of the constraints on advocacy. 
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constraints on, this behavior. It seeks to answer two related questions: (1) when do 
501(c)(3) organizations decide to become politically active, and (2) what are the 
organizational characteristics that correlate with the use of specific advocacy tactics? In 
answering these questions, this section develops a theoretical framework that addresses 
how the choice to advocate and the choice among strategies are related to one another 
and the specific decision criteria that organizations use when making each. 
Specifically, the framework presented here argues that the decision to advocate is 
a strategic response to conditions in the policy and political environment in which NPOs 
deliver services and that the content and character of that response are highly constrained 
by available resources. Nonprofit service providers decide to advocate when the threat 
from government institutions to their ability to deliver core services is sufficient to 
justify engaging in political activity and when they perceive the highest probability of 
success. Once an organization has decided to undertake some level of advocacy, its 
choice among the particular tactics for changing policy depends heavily on the level and 
nature of human and financial resources that it possesses.  
General Framework 
Nonprofit organizations are open systems which must respond and adapt to 
changes in the environment to survive (Salamon 1999). The decision to advocate and the 
choice among particular types of advocacy are best conceived of, therefore, as strategy 
formulation in an open system. 
Despite disparate conclusions in the strategy literature, authors have recently 
developed a general framework for modeling strategy formulation in complex 
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organizations, many of the components of which can provide a foundation for 
understanding the decision to advocate and the choice of advocacy strategies by NPOs. 
Boyne and Walker (2004) use the existing literature on strategy to argue that there are 
three levels of strategy formulation. These include the selection of primary missions and 
objectives, formulation of broad strategies to address environmental constraints on those 
objectives, and finally the selection of specific actions in the implementation of those 
strategies. The authors suggest that the levels of the framework are hierarchical, with 
each necessarily preceding the next.  
At the most general level of the framework are Strategic Processes, which refer 
to the formulation of objectives and mission (See also Hart 1992). This is similar to what 
Thompson (1967) defined as domain selection. For example, 501(c)(3) health and 
human service organizations have as their core mission the delivery of services, 
particularly to persons who might not otherwise have access to them. Advocacy and 
other organizational activities are necessarily secondary to this core mission. Although 
domain or strategic process selection is undeniably an important choice made by 
organizations, it is not particularly relevant to this investigation because all of the 
organizations in question have as their primary objective the delivery of services to 
clients. Thus, there is little or no variation in Strategic Processes across cases. 
Figure 2.1 presents graphically the next two stages of strategy formulation, which 
are germane to this investigation. After selecting a domain, Boyne and Walker (2004) 
suggest that organizations must assess environmental conditions to determine an 
appropriate Strategic Stance. This, according to the authors is the “broad way in which 
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organizations seek to extract needed resources from the environment” (Boyne and 
Walker 2004, 240). When determining its stance, the organization interprets signals 
from the environment to decide on a course of action that ensures organizational survival 
and success (See also Rubin 1988). The process of determining strategy stance is similar 
to what Thompson and McEwen (1958, 23) described as “organizational goal-setting,” 
which they define as “identifying the desired relationship between an organization and 
its environment.” Goals or strategic stances might include such things as increasing 
market share, improving client/customer satisfaction, or changing public policy 
regarding a particular program, service, or client group. 
After setting these general goals in response to environmental conditions, Boyne 
and Walker (2004) argue that organizations must choose a set of Strategic Actions. 
These are, according to the authors, “the specific actions that organizations may use to 
operationalize their stance” (Boyne and Walker 2004, 241). In other words, once an 
organization has decided that the environment necessitates a certain course of action 
(strategic stance), it must determine the specific activities that will help it to pursue that 
course most effectively. Strategic actions might include the temporary reallocation of 
resources or personnel, manipulation of structures or processes within the organization, 
or changes to the scope and character of relationships with those in the organization’s 
environment.  
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Figure 2.1        Strategy Formulation in Open Systems     (Adapted from Boyne and Walker 2004)
Strategic Processes
Strategic Stance
Strategic Actions
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Thus, Boyne and Walker (2004) seemingly provide a useful framework for 
organizing our thinking about the relationship between the decision to become politically 
active and the choice among advocacy tactics. I suggest that becoming politically active 
(i.e., advocating) is a strategy stance taken by some nonprofit service providers who then 
choose among a set of strategy actions that includes affiliation, grassroots activity, and 
direct lobbying. Within this general framework, however, a set of more specific 
questions remains. First, what environmental conditions are most relevant when 
organizations decide to advocate? Second, what are the primary strategy actions 
available to NPOs considering advocacy and what are the costs associated with each? 
And finally, beyond strategy stance, what are the factors that constrain organizational 
choices among various advocacy activities? 
The Importance of the Policy Environment. There is considerable evidence 
from scholars, practitioners, and regulators that the policy environment is relevant when 
NPOs consider advocating.6 Hopkins (1992) defines advocacy as “activities and 
expenditures designed to affect public policy.” Other notable scholars similarly define 
advocacy as the public expression and representation of interests and concerns which 
focuses on changing policies and securing collective goods (Jenkins 1987; Salamon 
1994).  
                                                 
6 Although they are typically described as singular, Thompson (1967) suggests that task environments are 
“multifaceted, or pluralistic, and composed of….numerous aggregates of individuals and other 
organizations” that influence organizational survival and success. Thompson goes on to assert that the 
pluralistic nature of the task environment introduces uncertainty and contingency that interfere with the 
rational decision-making processes preferred by organizations. They attempt to manage this complexity by 
isolating the elements of the environment that most closely relate to each organizational function and then 
dealing with those elements individually. Thus, rather than saying that organizations react to signals from 
the environment, it is more accurate to say that when deciding on a particular function they react to 
changes in the relevant environmental element(s). 
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Practitioners also think of advocacy activities within a policy context. Among the 
executive and public affairs directors of health and human services organizations 
surveyed by Berry (2003), a vast majority acknowledged changes in public policy as an 
important determinant of advocacy. “Securing new government policies that benefit 
clients” and “protecting existing policies that benefit clients” were the most common 
reasons given for lobbying by respondents in Berry’s study.  
Finally, those that regulate advocacy also define it in terms of public policy. The 
IRS form 990 asks 501(c)(3) organizations “in an attempt to change state policy, have 
you actively lobbied your state legislature?” 
Thus, it seems reasonable to assert that the policy environment provides a key 
motivating factor for advocacy activity among nonprofit service providers. Evidence 
suggests that NPOs choose to engage in activity designed to change public policy when 
that policy threatens their ability to deliver services or the well being of clients (Salamon 
1994; Boris and Krehely 2002; Cruz 2001). In the language of Boyne and Walker’s 
(2004) framework, NPOs adopt advocacy as a strategic stance when they feel that it is 
the best or only way to continue extracting needed resources from the policy 
environment. Institutional and resource factors emphasized in the existing literature can 
continue to be important constraints on the adoption of such a stance. They have, 
however, been supplanted by the policy environment as the primary causal explanation 
for advocacy. 
For the purposes of this study, the policy environment encompasses all 
governmental actions that regulate or facilitate an organization’s ability to deliver the 
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service that defines its core function or mission. The intergovernmental regulatory 
structure in the United States ensures that nonprofit service providers exist in a multi-
level policy environment, the different strata of which are defined by federal, state, and 
local governments. This multi-level environment could pose challenges to an analyst 
looking for relationships between environmental cues and organizational behavior.  
Fortunately, the complexity can be reduced somewhat because providers within a 
particular service area (e.g. mental health, family planning, job training) face a relatively 
unitary federal policy environment. Most national regulations will apply uniformly to all 
of the organizations in a particular area. The state-level policy environments in which 
these organizations deliver services can vary dramatically, however. Chapter IV will 
summarize the policy environments in which pro-choice nonprofit family planning 
service providers deliver services. 
Advocacy Related Strategic Actions Available to NPOs. Boyne and Walker’s 
framework suggests that after adopting a strategic stance, such as a dedication to 
changing public policy, an organization must decide upon a set of specific actions that 
allow it to pursue that broader goal. The tax code and existing literature on advocacy 
focus on three such activities. This is obviously not an exhaustive list, but it does include 
those categories of activity that 1) scholars and practitioners identify as most common 
and 2) the federal government feels are sufficiently meaningful to warrant regulation.  
When 501(c)(3) organizations declare their intention to influence public policy to 
the Internal Revenue Service, they are asked to report on three activities. The first of 
these is affiliation with a 501(c)(4) organization. 501(c)(4)s are traditional interest 
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groups that are largely unrestricted as to the scope and character of their lobbying 
activities. Contributions to these organizations are not tax deductible. So service 
providers can choose, in effect, to delegate part or all of their advocacy function to these 
organizations and may even create a 501(c)(4) explicitly for the purpose of influencing 
government. The only requirement imposed by the tax code on this activity it that the 
501(c)(3) must report its relationship with any and all such groups annually. 
The second type of advocacy that 501(c)(3)s must report is “grassroots 
lobbying.” So-called grassroots activities are generally defined as those that seek to 
change policy via alterations of public opinion. This classification can include policy 
oriented education of members and clients, policy specific public relations or media 
campaigns, or the dissemination of political information to the general public (Hopkins 
1992). Grassroots activities also include research activities designed to support education 
and public relations efforts and other community based activities (Cruz 2001). 
The final activity that 501(c)(3) service providers report to the IRS is “direct 
lobbying.” Here the definition provided to NPOs is more precise, with direct lobbying 
classified as the attempt to influence legislative behavior through direct contact with 
legislators (Hopkins 1992; Berry 2003; Boris and Krehely 2002). Obviously, direct 
lobbying, grassroots lobbying, and affiliation with a 501(c)(4) are not mutually exclusive 
activities and service providers can choose any or all of these as strategy actions. 
The activities listed above vary along several important dimensions in the costs 
that they impose on 501(c)(3) organizations. First, each strategy requires different levels 
of financial and human resources, with affiliation being lowest cost and direct lobbying 
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being highest (Cruz 2001). Affiliation with a 501(c)(4) often involves a monetary 
commitment on the part of the 501(c)(3), but there are also numerous examples in the 
tax record of service providers who claim an affiliation with a lobbying organization but 
do not provide monetary resources to that organization. Alternatively, direct legislative 
action is a relatively expensive activity. The interest group literature suggests that 
lobbying organizations that wish to be taken seriously have to develop and pay for the 
professional expertise and research capacity necessary to debate existing policy with 
lawmakers (Baumgartner and Leech 1998). Similarly, recent studies of NPO lobbying in 
state legislatures, Congress, and the courts indicate that legitimacy and influence require 
substantial resources (Basinger 2003). 
In addition to financial and human costs, the advocacy activities employed by 
nonprofit organizations vary dramatically in the amount of exposure that they bring to 
the organization. Affiliation with a 501(c)(4) organization scores lowest on this 
dimension, bringing relatively little scrutiny from political actors. Such affiliations are 
the method that national lawmakers recommend for service providers that wish to 
become politically active (Hopkins 1992). The Supreme Court has also consistently 
ruled that such affiliations are both legal and protected under the current tax code.  
Direct lobbying again has the highest exposure, necessarily opening the 
organization’s political activities to lawmakers who may directly influence tax exempt 
status and funding. Research suggests that managers of 501(c)(3)s perceive a clear 
relationship between direct lobbying activities and the probability of costly retribution 
by hostile politicians. Several of the executive and public affairs directors interviewed by 
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Berry (2003) recounted tales of IRS audits following mysteriously on the heels of 
testimony in front of Congressional committees. One suggested that such reprisals were 
clearly a “shot across the bow” of the organization by political actors who wished to 
discourage such overt political activity. 
Thus, there are three major activities that nonprofit service providers undertake 
when becoming politically active. In the context of Boyne and Walker’s (2004) 
framework, these activities best fit into the category of strategic actions intended to 
change relationships between the organization and its environment. Chapter VI will 
further discuss the character and scope of different advocacy activities used by 501(c)(3) 
organizations and the variation in costs for each. 
Constraints on Organizational Choices Among Advocacy Activities. The 
interest group literature in political science has reached consensus on few things, but one 
thing scholars agree upon is that successful interest groups employ a broad repertoire of 
strategies in their pursuit of policy influence (Sholzman and Tierney 1983; Cigler and 
Loomis 1991). In some studies, the leaders of these groups report that they may employ 
as many as 10 different strategies over the course of a policy battle (see Nownes and 
Freeman 1998). Thus, one would expect politically active 501(c)(3)s to make use of all 
the advocacy activities allowed by the tax code. In reality, however, few NPOs employ 
the entire repertoire of strategies. Of the 501(c)(3)s that advocate, only 14% affiliate 
with a 501(c)(4), undertake grassroots activity, and directly contact legislators and other 
political officials. 
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Obviously, something is constraining the choice of advocacy actions by 
politically active 501(c)(3)s. Because the existent literature on nonprofit advocacy has 
not addressed the choice among strategies, it offers little insight into the nature of that 
constraint. Additionally, Boyne and Walker (2004), beyond the general prediction that 
organizational characteristics influence the choice among strategic actions, offer few 
insights regarding the specific factors that may influence the choice among strategic 
actions by a nonprofit service provider. In order to identify these factors, therefore, I will 
turn to another literature which has studied similar activities as those identified by Boyne 
and Walker in organizations that share important characteristics with not-for-profit 
service providers considering advocacy.  
Although the terminology differs, the strategic actions described by Boyne and 
Walker (2004) and the advocacy activities identified above are analogous to what the 
large literature on social movement organizations (SMO) refers to and studies as tactics 
(McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Jasper 1997; Dalton 1994; Tilly 1979). One of the 
most consistent features in studies of SMOs and protest groups is the assertion that 
group and member resources are a powerful factor in decisions about tactics. Ennis 
(1987) argues that a group must choose a “field of action” that is not only consistent 
with its ideology and image, but also feasible given its financial and membership 
resource bases. Similarly, Meyer (1999: 30) argues that “with regard to resources, a 
well-endowed organization has more options for tactics than a poorly financed one.”  
The literature on SMOs also points out that, along with the differences in costs 
associated with different strategies, there are also different opportunity costs for each. 
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Specifically, different tactics may alienate important funders to a greater or lesser degree 
and, therefore, have different consequences for the continued receipt of needed funds. In 
addition to a desire to adhere to core mission and ideological preferences, organizations 
choose tactics based, in part, on their ability to bear these costs (Minkoff 1999).  
McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996) examine groups within several movements 
in the United States and Europe and discover that organizations that rely heavily on 
government funds are more likely to choose tactics that are less threatening to their 
funding relationships. Alternatively, groups with a diverse resource base were less 
constrained in their choice of tactics. Interestingly, this resource dependence argument is 
quite similar to the one made by students of nonprofit advocacy and reviewed earlier in 
this chapter. The insights from the literature on SMOs suggest, however, that resource 
dependence should be used to predict not the decision to become politically active, but 
rather the tactics that these groups employ in pursuit of the goal of changing policy. 
In addition to evidence from the literature on SMOs, organization theory also 
suggests that resources may be an important constraint on the choices made by NPOs. 
More specifically, authors have long suggested that slack resources—those above levels 
needed for core functions—allow organizations to absorb failures, bear the costs of 
adaptations and innovations, explore new ideas proactively, and exploit environmental 
opportunities more aggressively (Rosner 1968).  
Authors typically measure slack resources on two dimensions—financial and 
human.  Financial measures typically include total budgets, sources of revenue, and cost 
of core operations (Atkin and Hage 1971; Berry 1994; Daft and Becker 1978), while 
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human resources are typically measured as the size and expertise of relevant staff 
(Bourgeois 1981). Studies have demonstrated a strong relationship between the breadth 
of organizational innovation and slack resources on both dimensions (Berry 1994; 
Damanpour 1987). Finally, research also suggests that organizations possessing more 
human and financial resources than are necessary to maintain core operations are better 
able to manage environmental contingencies. 
So, there is reason to believe that a direct relationship exists between the level 
and type of resources that an organization possesses and its choice of strategy actions or 
tactics. In other words, the way in which an organization operationalizes its strategic 
stance—the tactics that it chooses—is constrained by available resources. Different 
actions typically impose different costs, and the choice among them is determined in 
large part by the organization’s ability to bear those costs. Tactics are a product not only 
of what the organization wants to do (strategic stance), but also of what it is able to do. 
In addition to describing the nature and costs of various advocacy activities, Chapter V 
will also develop specific testable hypotheses concerning the relationship between 
organizational resources and the choice among advocacy activities. 
Conclusion 
In summary, this chapter argues that the existing literature on nonprofit advocacy 
is incomplete because it ignores the impact of the policy environment on the advocacy 
decision and because it treats advocacy as a monolithic endeavor, rather than as a choice 
among available tactics. In response to these criticisms, the chapter also offers the 
theoretical framework for understanding nonprofit advocacy presented in Figure 2.2. 
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That framework suggests that nonprofit organizations assess the nature of the 
policy environment in which they deliver services when deciding whether or not to 
become politically active. When that environment is hostile or restrictive of the 
organizations ability to deliver services the NPO will adopt the strategic stance of 
changing policy through advocacy.  
When an organization decides to become politically active, it chooses from 
among available strategic actions or tactics based on available resources. An 
organization with few slack resources and high levels of resource dependence will 
choose low cost or low exposure strategies such as affiliation. Alternatively, a resource-
rich organization with a diverse funding base will be able to adopt numerous strategies, 
including high cost and high exposure tactics such as direct lobbying.  
The suggestion that advocacy is primarily a strategic response to the policy 
environment is clearly an alternative explanation to the ones presented in previous 
scholarship. The existence of rival hypotheses suggests the need for a test to determine 
the relative explanatory power of each. Chapter IV will present such a test by assessing 
the degree to which the policy environment predicts 501(c)(3) advocacy in a model that 
also includes measures of resource dependence and institutional development, which are 
the dominant explanations for advocacy offered in previous research.7  
                                                 
7 The dissertation does not explicitly offer a test of resource explanations for the choice among advocacy 
strategies against another model proposed in the literature because previous scholarship has not explored 
the choice among strategies or articulated such a model. 
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Figure 2.2 The Decision to Advocate and the Choice Among Advocacy Strategies by 501(c)(3) 
Organizations
501(c)(3) 
Service 
Provi der 
Facilitative Policy 
Environment
Do Not 
Advocate
Restrictive Policy 
Environment
Advocate
Resource poor or 
dependent NPO
Resource rich or 
independent NPO
Limited 
number of low 
cost and l ow 
exposure 
tactics
Multiple strategies 
including high cos t 
and high exposur e 
tactics
Strategic 
Processes
Strategic 
Stance
Strategic 
Actions
  
43
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
The previous chapter argues that advocacy among 501(c)(3)s is a strategic 
response to the policy environment in which these organizations deliver services, the 
specific nature of which is constrained by organizational resources. This chapter 
describes the research design and data used to test specific hypotheses generated by that 
general proposition. The first section explains and defends the dissertation’s focus on a 
particular category of nonprofit service provider. The second discusses the large-N 
controlled comparison approach taken herein and the advantages of that design over 
previous studies. The third section reviews the data collection process, focusing on both 
the general outlines of the data compiled by the National Center for Charitable Statistics 
and the specific data sets used in this analysis of nonprofit advocacy. Finally, the chapter 
concludes by identifying some limitations of the design and data used in this study. 
Unit of Analysis and Sample 
Federal and state governments that regulate these activities measure political 
activity by 501(c)(3)s on an organizational metric. More specifically, they require 
reporting of organizational participation and expenditure in the various categories of 
advocacy activity discussed in previous chapters. It seems logical, then, that any study of 
the factors that determine the amounts of these activities reported to the Internal 
Revenue Service and other regulatory bodies should also be conducted at the 
organizational level. Thus, the unit of analysis in this dissertation is the individual 
501(c)(3) organization. There were over 220,000 such organizations identified in the 
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2004 National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) created by the National Center for 
Charitable Statistics for use by the Internal Revenue Service.  
The next challenge is to choose a sample of these organizations that makes the 
analyses proposed in the last chapter tractable, while still allowing for valid inferences to 
nonprofit organizations outside the sample. Obviously, the easiest method is to draw a 
simple random sample from the universe of 501(c)(3)s. Unfortunately, that approach has 
one key shortcoming that makes it unsuitable for testing hypotheses concerning the 
factors that influence advocacy activity.  
Specifically, it is impossible to identify policies that are equally applicable to a 
random sample of 501(c)(3) organizations drawn from all categories of nonprofit service 
providers. In other words, it is difficult to argue that a policy setting the parameters of 
mental health provisions for Medicaid recipients has the same relevance to a nonprofit 
HIV/AIDS counseling center. Similarly, it is not logical to assume that the Carnegie 
Library Society and the Planned Parenthood Federation of America care equally about 
provisions in the Patriot Act that allow for the seizure of library patron records.  
Because the hypotheses presented in the previous chapter suggest that NPOs 
advocate when the policy environment poses a sufficient threat to their ability to deliver 
services, it is imperative that the policies identified as predictor variables have the same 
degree of relevancy for every organization in the sample. Unfortunately, because such 
organizations deliver vastly different services and clientele, the indicator could not 
accurately measure the presence of policies that restrict or facilitate the delivery of 
services across all organizations in the NCCS sample. In other words, any 
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operationalization of relevant public policy in a study that included a random sample of 
501(c)(3) organizations would necessarily have low construct validity. 
To make the analyses proposed in the last chapter tractable and to develop a valid 
measure of the policy environment, this dissertation draws a “purposive” sample of 
501(c)(3) organizations. The selection criterion for inclusion in the sample is the type of 
service delivered by the organization. More specifically, I test for the impact of public 
policy and organizational resources on the advocacy activities of 501(c)(3) organizations 
that deliver reproductive health and family planning services to clients. In choosing the 
organizations for this sample I began with the general NTEE (National Taxonomy of 
Exempt Entities) classifications. I chose those organizations classified with the NTEE 
designation E40 and E42.  
Those groups classified as E40 are Reproductive Health Care organizations. 
These organizations provide medical, educational, and counseling services which relate 
to the “conception, deliver, and care of offspring.” They include organizations other than 
those that simply offer family planning services and include: fertility treatment centers, 
human sexuality education and counseling centers, obstetric and gynecology clinics, 
pregnancy termination and abortion clinics, prenatal care and childbirth preparation 
centers, and voluntary sterilization centers. This category excludes those groups that are 
concerned with prevention of adolescent pregnancy, maternity homes for unwed 
mothers, and advice and guidance programs that focus on adolescent parents. Those 
organizations that are classified as E42 by the NTEE include all organizations that 
provide assistance for people who want to control the size of their families and the 
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spacing of their children, usually through some form of birth control. Planned 
Parenthood organizations are found in this group.  
I exclude from the sample any organizations that explicitly identify themselves as 
pro-life organizations. These groups are identified in three ways. First, many pro-life 
organizations carry an NTEE classification of R62 and are actually social action groups. 
As such, these are not included in my sample. Second, I examine the mission statements 
of remaining organizations for reference to conservative religious values or sentiments, 
explicit reference to pro-life concerns, or abstinence only programs, which might 
connote a pro-life stance. Finally, I search the financial and collaboration information 
within the 990s and remove all organizations that were affiliated with more overt pro-life 
groups, as well as those that participate in clear pro-life fundraising opportunities. The 
risk of organizations not being detected by these procedures because they hide their pro-
life agenda is relatively low. The nonprofit literature suggests that the necessity of 
fundraising should mitigate such activities. Pro-life organizations will want to court 
funders who are also pro-life and expect to see an overt pro-life stance from the 
organizations they support. 
There are three factors that helped to determine the choice of pro-choice 
reproductive health service providers for this study. First, these organizations deliver one 
or more, though not necessarily all, of a relatively homogenous set of services including 
contraception, maternal and child health, venereal disease screening and treatment, 
information/counseling regarding the termination of pregnancy, and abortion procedures. 
Second, as the next chapter demonstrates, it is relatively easy to identify public policies 
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that are specifically designed to restrict or facilitate the delivery of these services. 
Reproductive health and women’s rights groups identify 13 such policies enacted by 
state legislatures over the past decade. Finally, and most importantly for the purposes of 
this study, these policies, individually or in total, should have roughly the same degree of 
relevance to all organizations classified as 501(c)(3) reproductive health/family planning 
service providers. 
The challenge that remains is demonstrating that a study of reproductive 
health/family planning organizations can produce findings that are generalizable to other 
501(c)(3) service providers outside of that frame. Studies which rely on purposive 
samples can be generalizable so long as the members of the sample mirror the 
population to a significant degree on all indicators except the selection criterion. Patton 
(1990) argues that external validity is possible when selected cases can be shown to be 
“typical” of the cases to which the researcher wishes to generalize.  
In my judgment, organizations classified as reproductive health/family planning 
service providers are “typical” of organizations in the largest categories of 501(c)(3)s. 
They are statistically equivalent to those organizations classified as Human Service or 
Health Providers by the NTEE on a host of indicators, as explained below. Health and 
Human Service organizations made up 49% of all 501(c)(3)s between 1998 and 2001 
and include the vast majority of third sector organizations that provide programmatic 
services to clients.8  
                                                 
8 The only substantial set of service provision organizations that are not included under the umbrella of 
Health and Human Service are those that provide primary, secondary, and post-secondary education 
services.  
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Based on difference of means tests between the relevant subgroup of 
reproductive health providers and the population of Health and Human Service 
providers, the two have similar levels of total organizational income (p<.42), total 
organizational revenue (p<.26), total government grants (p<.55), direct and indirect 
public support (p<.29), and the proportion of total revenue from government sources 
(p<.27). These providers also pay similar compensation to managerial and professional 
staff as do other Human Service and Health organizations (p<.44) and spend similar 
amounts on lobbying (p<.24). Finally, a similar percentage of reproductive health 
providers and Health and Human Service providers employ a specialized public affairs 
director (p<.22), and engage in political activity (p<.33).  
These similarities suggest that findings from analyses of 501(c)(3) reproductive 
health/family planning providers should provide insights into the activities of more than 
100,000 nonprofit health and human service organizations currently providing services 
to clients in this country. Reproductive health/family planning organizations do not share 
all of these similarities with other categories of 501(c)(3) organizations – such as tax-
exempt fundraising organizations, foundations, pension and retirement funds, religion 
related organizations, international and foreign relations groups, environmental and 
animal benefit organizations, groups dedicated to art and cultural pursuits, and education 
organizations. As a result, readers should use caution when applying the conclusions 
drawn from this study to these groups.  
The one notable exception to this general statement is for education 
organizations, which often serve underrepresented clients with little voice in the political 
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process. Interestingly, these organizations share some key characteristics with 
reproductive health/family planning organizations including similar levels of 
professionalization and specialization and similar levels of dependence on government 
funding.  They tend to advocate with the same frequency, and they spend a similar 
proportion of total revenue on lobbying activities. Despite these similarities, education 
organizations are, on average, smaller than reproductive health NPOs and more reliant 
on direct charitable contributions. Because of these differences, readers should also 
apply conclusions from this study to this category of 501(c)(3) with some degree of 
caution.  
Research Design 
This dissertation employs a large-N, controlled comparison, non-experimental 
design to test hypotheses regarding the factors that influence advocacy activities among 
501(c)(3) organizations. Pollock (2003) suggests that the controlled comparison design 
is appropriate when theory suggests multiple rival explanations for an observed 
phenomenon, but the unit of analysis or other factors prevent the researcher from 
isolating causal influences in a true experimental setting. I have suggested that the policy 
environment is the key determinant of advocacy activity among nonprofit service 
providers, while the existing literature suggests that resource dependence and 
institutional factors motivate political activity. Because the unit of analysis in this study 
is the organization and the dependent variables are measures of organizational behavior, 
a controlled comparison of 501(c)(3) organizations is the most tractable means for 
determining the explanatory power of these rival explanations. 
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There are numerous ways to “control” for alternative explanations when 
comparing observations. In small-n research in political science, the most common 
method is the matching of a limited number of observations in either a “most similar” or 
“most different” system design. An alternative approach, and the one taken in this 
dissertation, is to expand the number of observations sufficiently to allow for statistical 
controls of alternative explanations. Although the comparison of a large number of 
observations in this fashion has well documented pitfalls, including threats to internal 
validity, it can offer advantages over matching designs in terms of external validity. 
Thus, this dissertation investigates the impact of the policy environment on advocacy 
decisions in over 300 501(c)(3) organizations while statistically controlling for other 
potential causes of political activity. 
This large-N controlled comparison approach offers advantages over research 
designs employed in previous studies of nonprofit advocacy, the majority of which have 
been exploratory in nature (see Berry 2003 for an exception). Those studies that have 
attempted to empirically investigate political activity by 501(c)(3) organizations have 
typically used elite interviewing as their primary method of data collection, and they 
relied on samples of convenience for the selection of subjects. Similarly, these studies 
rarely attempt to demonstrate that selected cases are typical or representative of a larger 
population (see Cruz 2001 as a representative example of such work). While often 
providing rich ideographic detail, the obvious drawback to such studies is that they 
prevent inference to individuals or organizations beyond those directly observed by the 
researcher. 
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Such exploratory designs and methods are most appropriate when little is known 
about a subject, or when theory development is insufficient to generate a set of testable 
hypotheses. In the case of nonprofit advocacy, however, a small but growing literature 
has already developed theoretically grounded expectations. What is missing from the 
literature is a large-N analysis that can discriminate among hypothesized influences. 
Even studies of nonprofit advocacy with a large-N design have primarily limited their 
focus to describing the advocacy function and its organizational correlates. For example, 
Berry (2003) identifies many of the hypothesized motivators for and constraints on 
political activity reviewed in the previous chapter. After collecting data on over 500 
501(c)(3) organizations, however, he does not construct a model that allows for 
rigorously testing these hypothesized rival explanations. The controlled comparison 
design employed in this study will allow for such a test. 
Data 
I gathered data on expenditures for political activities and collaboration with 
other lobbying organizations, as well as information on organizational revenue and 
personnel, from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). NCCS is the 
national repository of data on nonprofit organizations in the United States. Its “Core 
Files” are produced annually and compiled from information that nonprofit 
organizations are required by the tax code to report to the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS). This information is primarily drawn from the IRS Form 990 and Form 990 
Schedule A. The Core Files also contain descriptive information from the IRS Business 
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Master Files and financial variables from the IRS Return Transaction Files that have 
been cleaned by NCCS.  
These data contain unusually comprehensive financial information on charitable 
organizations and, according to scholars who have worked extensively with the Form 
990s, are well suited to studying the lobbying activities of 501(c)(3) organizations. 
Indeed, Krehely (2001) argues that the NCCS data allow researchers the opportunity to 
compare politically active organizations of a specific type with similar organizations that 
choose not to lobby, in a large-N design. 
As subsequent discussions will note, the reliability of a new version of the Form 
990 data that I employ in this study has been significantly improved, but analyses of 
these older data suggest that even they can produce valid conclusions about non-profit 
activity in the appropriate design. Studies by Froelich and Knoepfle (1996) and Froelich 
et al. (2000) found the earlier 990 data to be generally reliable, identifying primarily 
range of magnitude problems, to which a large-N regression based analysis such as mine 
should be robust. Additionally, the most common errors identified in these studies 
occurred in variables that are not employed in this study. 
The following variables are but a small sample of the full set contained in the 
core files and that are particularly useful for an analysis of lobbying activity. I will 
explain in detail in later chapters the specific variables I use to operationalize concepts 
of interest for this research, but this review helps to illuminate the richness of the NCCS 
data as a source for the study of advocacy activity: 
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Part III, Line 1: “During the year, has the organization attempted to influence 
national, state, or local legislation, including any attempt to influence public 
opinion on a legislative matter or referendum? If ‘Yes,’ enter the total expenses 
paid or incurred in connection with the lobbying activities.” 
Part VI-A, Line 36: “Total lobbying expenditures to influence public opinion 
(grassroots lobbying).” 
Part VI-A, Line 37: “Total lobbying expenditures to influence a legislative body 
(direct lobbying).” 
Part VI-A, Line 38: “Total lobbying expenditures.9”  
All organizations must respond to Part III, Line 1, however, Part VI-A, Lines 36, 
37, and 38 are answered only by organizations that make the 501 (h) election to 
lobby. 
Despite the usefulness and strength of these older core data, scholars have 
identified several weaknesses. First, some suggest that there are ways to participate in 
advocacy other than by just grassroots or direct lobbying. Thus, some activities might be 
missed by the “coarseness” of the IRS data. Additionally, scholars point to the fact that, 
in the past, organizations grossing less than $25,000 were not required to file an IRS 
Form 990 and argue that these unregistered organizations carry out some lobbying 
activity (Colwell 1997). Finally, scholars note that some of the key variables for analysis 
are aggregate measures, which may limit the scope and depth of any analysis. For 
                                                 
9 The core files also have data on “excess” lobbying expenditures for electing organizations. 
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instance, the “contributions” revenue variable in the core files is a total of all monies 
from private individuals, foundations, and government grants. 
Fortunately, the bulk of the concerns listed above have been overcome by newly 
collected and organized data available from the NCCS for 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001. 
The newly available Digitized Data contain the same information as the Core Files, but 
also incorporate additional information designed to compensate for several of the 
weaknesses discussed above.10 The new data resource includes information on the 
lobbying activities and techniques of non-electing organizations, variables representing 
the subcategories for currently aggregated revenue and expense variables, and finally, 
information on what organizations the reported group is linked to both financially and 
managerially. This last information allows researchers to know if a 501(c)(3) 
organization is affiliated with a 501(c)(4) organization (Krehely 2001).   
As a final addition to the information contained in the Core Files, the Digitized 
Data contain program descriptions as reported in Part III of Form 990. The data are 
keyword searchable, which allows researchers to identify organizations that engage in 
broader or nontraditional advocacy work.  
In addition to being substantively useful for the study of nonprofit advocacy, the 
NCCS digitized data also have high reliability. There is, undoubtedly, some reporting 
error among the more than 200,000 organizations that file 990s and there is likely to be 
some error introduced as the data are processed by NCCS. However, much of this will 
be random error, and such errors in the NCCS data should be significantly less than that 
                                                 
10 See http://nccsdataweb.urban.org for a more technical discussion of the changes in the Digitized Data. 
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tolerated in much social science research for two reasons. Because the IRS has the 
capability to audit the information provided by these organizations and punish them 
monetarily for mistakes, this information should be considerably more accurate than data 
on advocacy collected from other sources.  
In addition to the improved reliability created by the threat of IRS sanctions, the 
Urban Institute and the National Center for Charitable Statistics provide a remarkable set 
of tools for assessing the accuracy of the data that they collect. Specifically, the data set 
includes accuracy checks for every financial indicator from the Form 990 that requires 
reporting organizations to add multiple dollar figures. For example, variables such as 
Total Revenue, Total Government Grants, Total Rental Income and the like are 
accompanied by a “verification indicator,” which alerts the researcher to any 
inaccuracies in the organization’s arithmetic. The indicator takes on values of 1 to 7, 
with 1 corresponding to 0 error and 7 corresponding to error greater than 25%. I include 
only those observations where the verification indicator suggests error of less than 5% in 
subsequent analyses.  
In an effort to ensure that the data used throughout this dissertation are as 
accurate as possible, an additional evaluation of the organizations in the sample was 
done. In the process of this examination, I found that a number of organizations were 
primarily research based organizations. Because they were not service providers, they 
did not seem appropriate for analysis and were also removed from the sample. 
Additionally, several organizations were misclassified as family planning and 
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reproductive health providers when they did not provide either service. These 
organizations were also removed. 
So, as a review, the preparation of the data for this study included first the 
isolation of organizations classified by the NTEE as E40 and E42 service providers. 
Next, I conducted a manual examination of the Form 990s that identified pro-life, 
primarily research based, and misclassified organizations. Finally, I excluded 
organizations with greater than 5% error on the verification indicators for variables used 
in the analyses. These procedures, which are in keeping with NCCS recommendations 
for researchers using these data, yielded a total sample of 487 family planning and 
reproductive health providers. 
After selecting this sample, I remained concerned about one additional source of 
error. Krehley (2001) suggests that one of the common types of error in the older core 
files was a failure by organizations to attach certain required forms when filing the Form 
990. In an effort to eliminate such concerns, I again manually checked the returns of all 
providers in my sample and verified that 100% of these organizations had filed the 
advocacy related attachments required by the IRS.  
Thus, I am confident that the data used in subsequent analyses has a high degree 
of reliability. Conclusions drawn from NCCS data should also have a high degree of 
validity. Threats to the validity of research come especially from the existence of 
systematic errors in data and there is no evidence that nonprofit organizations 
systematically misrepresent their lobbying activities, revenues, or expenditures to the 
IRS (Krehely 2001). Again, the threat of sanctions by the IRS limits systematic 
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“cheating” by these organizations. In 2002, some organizations actually informed the 
IRS that they had exceeded the allowable lobbying expenditures by designating the 
“excess” category on the Form 990. Thus, in the absence of systematic error, 
conclusions drawn from analyses of the NCCS Digitized Data should be valid. 
The NCCS data discussed above provide information on 501(c)(3) organizations 
necessary for dependent variables measuring the presence and type of political activity, 
as well as information needed to operationalize rival explanations for advocacy focusing 
on professionalism and resource dependence. In order to allow for more nuanced 
analyses, I have also hand coded spending by these organizations on both grassroots 
lobbying and direct lobbying, differentiating between h-electors and non-h electors. This 
information is not available in the data provided by the NCCS. 
It is rich with information, but the NCCS data does not allow for the 
measurement of the policy environment, which is one of the key independent variables 
proposed in the last chapter. To gain a comprehensive picture of the policies that restrict 
or facilitate the delivery of services by the 501(c)(3)s under study here, I rely on the 
annual state-level survey of reproductive rights conducted by the National Abortion 
Rights League (NARAL). Although NARAL clearly has a normative stance on the issue, 
they are regarded as one of the most reliable sources for factual information on 
reproductive health policy in the United States (McFarlane and Meier 2001). 
The State-by-State Report on the Status of Women’s Reproductive Rights, 
published by NARAL for the last 13 years, scores states on thirteen different policy 
dimensions. The specific policies contained therein and the methodology for 
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constructing an indexed measure of the reproductive health policy environment will be 
explored in detail in the next chapter. For now, however, I will limit the discussion to the 
sources for the data used by NARAL in the creation of the Report. Data on access to 
reproductive health, including the prevalence of providers, is gathered from the Alan 
Guttmacher Institute from 1996 to 2000. Information on the behavior of state 
legislatures, including proposed and enacted legislation, is gathered by NARAL’s in-
house researchers, as well as through the Legislative Tracking Program at the Center for 
Reproductive Rights.11 
Limitations of This Study 
Although I am confident that it will provide a rigorous contribution to the 
existing literature on nonprofit advocacy, the study proposed here also has limitations 
that warrant mention. First, as noted above, a large-N controlled comparison design has 
the advantage of allowing for empirical tests among competing explanations for 
nonprofit advocacy. The disadvantage of such a design, however, is its inability to match 
the ideographic nuance and context provided by a small-N qualitative design. I am 
careful to ensure throughout the dissertation that operational definitions match concepts 
of interest as closely as possible, but there is some divergence between concept and 
measure in this type of design.  
An additional, but related, limitation of this research design also deserves 
mention. Namely, the NCCS data can tell us a great deal about what nonprofit 
organizations do and spend, which we can use to identify the environmental and 
                                                 
11 The Center for Reproductive Rights is a legal advocacy group for reproductive health, similar in scope 
and stature to the environmental defense fund in the area of environmental policy. 
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organizational correlates of those activities. They cannot, however, tell us what nonprofit 
managers think or feel, or expose the exact causal relationship between the above 
mentioned factors and managerial decisions about advocacy. As noted above, there are 
clear advantages to the Large-N data driven analyses employed in this study, but those 
advantages are accompanied by limitations from which qualitative small sample studies 
may not suffer. Thus, the conclusions from this study should be seen as compliments to, 
rather than replacements for, the findings from these other types of research designs.  
The third limitation of the study deals with the generalizability of findings 
regarding the motivation for political activity. As discussed in this chapter, the similarity 
between reproductive health/family planning providers and other Health and Human 
Service providers should help to ensure that results are generalizable to a relatively large 
proportion of 501(c)(3) organizations. I also noted previously, however, that readers 
should apply the findings to other types of 501(c)(3)s, including foundations, fund 
raising organizations, and others with caution. 
Even within the realm of Health and Human Service providers, however, one 
additional caveat about generalizability is warranted. Specifically, the findings may be 
less applicable to those providers that do not have a clear policy relationship with 
government. In other words, if government policy does not target a particular service, 
either restricting or facilitating the delivery thereof, it is more difficult to argue that the 
provider of that service will be motivated to political action by the policy environment. 
Yet, it is difficult to imagine that many Health and Human Service providers fit this 
scenario. The mere presence of a government grant for a particular service signals the 
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existence of public policy that facilitates, but may also restrict, the delivery of that 
service. Nonetheless, findings here should be applied with caution to organizations for 
which the policy environment is of modest relevance. 
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CHAPTER IV 
POLICY, POLITICS, AND NONPROFIT ADVOCACY 
 
Introduction 
 
This dissertation has suggested that advocacy activity among nonprofit service 
providers is best conceived of as strategic action by complex organizations. Borrowing 
from the literature on organizational strategy, I argue that strategy formulation is a two-
stage decision whereby organizations adopt a general strategic stance based on 
environmental conditions and then select a set of strategic actions based on available 
organizational resources (Boyne and Walker 2004). Chapter II develops the argument 
that the decision to become politically active is a strategic stance adopted by NPOs and 
is, therefore, primarily driven by environmental features, while the choice among 
advocacy strategies is analogous to the choice of strategic actions, and is determined 
largely by organizational characteristics. 
This chapter explores the first stage in the advocacy decision—the choice to 
become politically active. Rather than institutional and resource dependence 
explanations offered for such activity in the existing literature, I suggest that differences 
in the policy environment in which NPOs deliver services and variation in the political 
environments in which they must advocate should be the key predictors of political 
activity. Specifically, the chapter argues that advocacy is a strategic stance taken by 
nonprofit service providers when conditions in the policy environment threaten their 
ability to deliver services and that these organizations are more likely to adopt this 
stance in favorable political climates. 
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This chapter reviews the model of nonprofit advocacy put forth by existing 
studies before more fully developing the alternative expectations discussed above. It 
then puts general expectations regarding the impact of policy and politics within the 
context of the specific state-level policy and political environments in which these 
providers serve clients. Following this discussion, the chapter develops specific 
expectations about the relationship between these environments and the choice to 
become politically active. Finally, the chapter tests those expectations in analyses of 487 
service providers in 2001. 
Theory 
The Traditional Model 
The existing literature emphasizes institutional characteristics and resource 
factors as the primary explanations for advocacy by 501(c)(3) service providers. 
Institutional theorists suggest that significant actors within an organization’s network 
such as funders, the public, state agencies, and professional associations develop and 
enforce normative rules for organizational behavior. Because of the established roles of 
these actors in society, those norms tend to be relatively conservative and moderate. 
According to institutional theorists, the more enmeshed that an NPO becomes within 
networks of these actors, the greater influence these conservative norms have over its 
behavior and the less likely that it is to engage in advocacy activity (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991).  Institutional explanations hypothesize that organizational size, the degree 
of staff professionalization, and the amount of advocacy undertaken by successful 
organizations in the NPO’s immediate environment all influence the decision to become 
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politically active (Oliver 1991; Kramer 1994; Salamon 1995; LuBove 1965; Withorn 
1984; Hall 1987).  
As an alternative to these more traditional institutional approaches, recent 
scholarship on nonprofit advocacy suggests a contrary set of expectations regarding the 
impact of professionalization and organizational capacity. Berry (2003) agrees that the 
tax code poses a severe institutional constraint on nonprofit advocacy, but argues that 
within that constraint, organizations with greater financial and human capacity are more 
likely to advocate relative to smaller and less well developed NPOs. 
Along with these conflicting institutional explanations, the traditional model of 
nonprofit advocacy includes the nature of the organization’s resource base as a key 
predictor of political activity. From the resource dependence perspective, the dominant 
environmental constraint on the advocacy function is the threat that advocacy poses to 
the procurement of government funds (Cruz 2001). Manser, reflecting this perspective 
asserts that “an agency’s freedom and effectiveness in social action or advocacy may be 
in inverse proportion to the amount of public money that it receives” (Manser 1974:421). 
Others draw causal links between the growing use of third sector organizations to deliver 
government services, the increasing reliance of those organizations on consistent sources 
of public revenue, and the greater acquiescence by NPOs to the demands of government 
funders (Wolch 1990). Taken together, resource dependence explanations suggest that, 
as the proportion of total revenue made up of government contracts and grants increases, 
the likelihood of an NPO engaging in advocacy activity decreases (See also Kramer 
1985; Beck 1970). 
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An Alternative Model of Nonprofit Advocacy 
In contrast to existing explanations for nonprofit advocacy, this dissertation 
suggests that the policy and political environments influence the decision by nonprofit 
service providers to become politically active. Advocacy is designed to affect public 
policy and secure collective goods for clients (Jenkins 1987; Salamon 1994), and not to 
change levels of professionalization within the organization or change the nature of the 
resource base. For this reason, I assert that the latter factors may constrain the advocacy 
function, but that they do not provide the motivation for political activity by nonprofit 
service providers.  
The Impact of the Policy Environment. There is considerable evidence from 
both nonprofit managers and scholars that public policy is an important motivator of 
political activity. Previous qualitative studies of NPO advocacy confirm via interviews 
with executive and public affairs directors that policy motivates advocacy. Respondents 
in Berry’s (2003) study offer  “securing new government policies that benefit clients” 
and “protecting existing policies that benefit clients” as the most common reasons for 
lobbying (Berry 2003). Similarly, the administrators interviewed by Cruz (2001: 61) 
indicated that they advocate primarily to enhance their ability to “use the political system 
to pursue important social programs” and to “counteract” what they see as an increasing 
number of restrictive legislative proposals. 
There is also evidence from the literature on interest groups in political science 
which suggests changes in public policy are a key motivator for political activity by 
previously inactive groups. Truman (1951:41) suggests that member and professional 
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organizations, such as the American Bar Association or the American Medical 
Association, choose to enter the policy battle and become “political interest groups” only 
in response to “threats from government institutions.” Truman argues that, for groups 
not formed explicitly for political purposes, lobbying legislators and other advocacy 
activities represent deviations from core missions, which will only be undertaken when 
public policies become sufficiently threatening to member benefits or organizational 
survival.  
The Importance of the Political Environment. In addition to the policies that 
influence service delivery, NPOs assess the political environment in which they must 
advocate for change before becoming politically active. Although they are often 
conflated, the policy and political environments are distinct from one another and must 
be considered separately. For example, the same policy restricting the ability of an NPO 
to deliver “liberal” services could theoretically exist in a state where conservative values 
dominate in the citizenry and the legislature, in a state with a narrow conservative 
majority in the legislature but a large concentration of liberal citizens in urban areas, or 
in a state where the legislature has traditionally been controlled by conservative 
Republicans but has recently seen a shift in partisan control. In these examples, the 
policy environments are the same, but the political environments faced by an NPO 
attempting to influence policy are starkly different. 
Two literatures provide the foundation for assertions about the importance of the 
political environment in advocacy decisions. First, scholarship on interest groups 
consistently argues that these groups are more likely to lobby friends. In other words, 
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groups spend the majority of their effort reinforcing the beliefs of elected officials and 
citizens that already agree with them and expend few resources trying to change the 
views of opponents (Milbrath 1963; Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; Zeigler 1964). 
Austen-Smith and Wright (1994) challenge this longstanding conclusion, but subsequent 
research has demonstrated that their study is flawed in important ways and not adequate 
to discredit years of consistent findings (See Baumgartner and Leech 1996). Thus, the 
literature suggests that groups attempting to influence policy will be most active where 
the number of political allies is highest. 
The broad and far reaching literature on rational choice in organizational 
decision-making (See Barnard 1938; Allison 1971; Frank 1994) also suggests that NPOs 
should be most active in politically favorable climates. As noted in the previous chapter, 
advocacy activity poses risks to NPOs in terms of loss of tax exempt status, loss of 
government funding, and the mobilization of political opponents. Rational choice theory 
argues that decisions among risky alternatives are based not only on the potential benefit 
of a positive outcome, but also on the perceived probability of success (von Neumann 
and Morgenstern 1947; Levy 1997). NPOs should anticipate a significantly higher 
probability of success in politically favorable environments and, thus, be more willing to 
take the risk of advocacy. 
The Policy and Political Environments of Nonprofit Reproductive  
 
Health Providers 
 
A review of the distinct environments discussed above will help in the 
development of specific hypotheses concerning the advocacy activity of reproductive 
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health service providers. This section will briefly explore the state-level public policies 
that govern the delivery of reproductive health services and illustrate the divergent 
political environments that often produce like policy. 
Policy. The policy environments faced by reproductive health providers have 
considerable variation along a number of dimensions. For the sake of parsimony, 
however, these myriad policies can be divided into two rough categories—those that 
facilitate the ability of NPOs to provide these services to clients and those that restrict 
the services or information that NPOs can deliver.12  
Facilitative state laws are both constitutional and statutory. Courts in 15 states 
have ruled that their state constitutions provide more protections for reproductive choice 
that does the federal Constitution’s penumbra protection of privacy rights. In thirteen of 
these states, the courts have ruled explicitly that the state constitution prohibits the 
removal of medically necessary reproductive health care from services covered by 
Medicaid.  
There is also a small number of state-level statutes, both symbolic and 
substantive, that facilitate the delivery of reproductive health services. Seven state 
legislatures have openly declared their support for a woman’s right to reproductive 
freedom. Fifteen states have laws that allow the public funding of abortions for the 
medically or categorically needy. Finally, fifteen states have enacted laws protecting 
reproductive health clinic personnel and clientele from verbal harassment and violence.  
                                                 
12 The following information on state-level policies in 2001 is drawn from annual surveys conducted by 
the Center for Reproductive Rights (http://www.crlp.org/) and the Alan Guttmacher Institute (www.agi-
usa.org). Results from the CRR surveys are available on their webpage, while the Guttmacher surveys are 
available only through the National Abortion Rights League (www.naral.org). 
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Current state laws that substantively or symbolically restrict the delivery of 
reproductive health services are greater in number. In terms of substantive policy, thirty-
one states have enacted bans on late-term abortions, while 26 require that all women 
receive state-approved counseling and observe a mandatory waiting period before 
receiving an abortion. Nine states require that married women receive the consent of 
their husbands before terminating a pregnancy. Fifteen states prohibit public funds from 
being used to pay for any reproductive health services, and 6 prevent private insurers 
from paying for abortion services in the absence of an additional premium. Seventeen 
states have enacted laws that prevent employees of organizations receiving state monies 
from counseling women regarding the availability of abortion services. Texas limits the 
dissemination of contraceptives to minors, and several states restrict the access to 
“emergency contraception” for all women.13 Finally, twenty states require that 
reproductive health providers maintain and report aggregate patient information that is 
more detailed than information collected by other healthcare providers. 
On the symbolic front, 7 state legislatures have openly declared a pro-life stance 
on reproductive health issues. Three states issue “pro-life” license plates, proceeds from 
the sale of which benefit clinics that do not provide a full array of family planning and 
reproductive health services, including abortions and contraceptives. Finally, several 
states have granted embryos and fetuses the same legal protections as mothers. Texas 
                                                 
13 The emergency contraceptive under debate in these states is sold under the name Plan B® , which the 
Food and Drug Administration’s Advisory Committee on Nonprescription drugs recently recommended be 
made available without a prescription. 
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has recently rewritten its State Child Health Insurance Rules (SCHIP) to extend 
coverage to fetuses upon conception.  
Politics. Scholarly research on reproductive health in the American states 
suggests that ideology and interest group activity correlate in predictable ways with the 
policies discussed above. McFarlane and Meier (2001) argue for a relatively 
straightforward relationship where conservative legislatures and large numbers of 
religious adherents produce restrictive family planning policies. Thus, the authors 
suggest a relatively high correlation between politics and policy.  
I suggest, however, that findings from McFarlane and Meier (2001) oversimplify 
the complex political environment surrounding reproductive health policies. The 
findings from their study are largely an artifact of their choice of dependent variables, 
which include state-level expenditures on family planning activities and the abortion 
rate, but only one actual reproductive health policy. Specifically, the authors model only 
the presence or absence of parental notification restrictions and suggest that the findings 
from a study of this individual policy can be used to predict the overall tenor of the 
reproductive health policy environment. 
When the many policies that actually comprise that environment are taken into 
account, however, the correlation between politics and policy begins to erode. In 2001, 
the correlation between a widely accepted measure of state liberalism (Berry et al. 1998) 
and the most comprehensive index of state-level reproductive health policy (NARAL 
2004) was only .33. Anecdotes from individual states reinforce the veracity of this 
summary finding. Illinois, a moderately liberal state, mandates counseling and waiting 
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periods for women seeking abortions, requires a husband’s consent for pregnancy 
termination by married women, prohibits insurance companies from paying for abortion 
services under regular policies, and restricts the use of public funds for provision of 
reproductive health services. Alternatively, New Mexico, a politically conservative state 
with a high proportion of Catholics, lacks all of these restrictions except the last and 
allows the use of public facilities for all but a limited set of services.  
Thus, reproductive health providers face distinct policy and political 
environments when they make decisions about political activity. I believe that, in this 
context, the latter is best conceived of in terms of levels of mass and elite liberalism. The 
interest group literature suggests that groups are more likely to lobby friends, or those 
that share their views, because they recognize the low probability of actually changing 
the opinions of political foes. In the case of NPOs they may be targeting advocacy 
activity at either legislators through direct lobbying or the public more generally through 
grassroots activities. In states where a large majority of these actors are very 
conservative, and thus opposed to the types of services provided by pro-choice 
reproductive health providers, the probability of changing opinions and influencing 
policy is quite low. The incentive for NPOs to spend scarce resources in such 
environments is, likewise, very small. 
Hypotheses 
The discussion presented above suggests a set of empirically testable hypotheses 
regarding the political activity of nonprofit reproductive health providers. First, it 
suggests that the likelihood of these NPOs becoming politically active increases as the 
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number of state-level policies restricting the delivery of reproductive health services 
increases. Second, because reproductive health services are generally favored by 
political liberals and opposed by conservatives, I expect that the likelihood of NPOs that 
offer these services advocating to change public policy increases as the political 
liberalism of a state increases.  
Variables and Methods 
Unit of Analysis 
As noted in Chapter III, this dissertation tests assertions regarding the advocacy 
activities of not-for-profit organizations in an analysis of nonprofit family planning and 
reproductive health providers. This section briefly reviews the justifications offered 
therein for the choice of this particular type of provider. 
I have chosen a particular segment of service delivery organizations to focus on 
for one important reason. To identify the policy and political context that a nonprofit 
organization functions in, it is first necessary to be able to identify the specific policies 
that an NPO is concerned with. By necessity then, I have to pick a specific type of 
provider to facilitate the identification of such policies. For example, it would be 
difficult to identify a single state-level policy that directly limited the ability of all 
human service delivery organizations within a state. However, it is easy to make the 
argument that a state law requiring parental notification for abortion and contraception 
provision will be of concern to all reproductive health and family planning service 
providers serving clients in that state.  
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The need to identify specific policies makes the selection of reproductive 
health/family planning service providers justifiable, but they are also an attractive choice 
because they are similar to other NPO service providers in many respects. They are a 
part of the sector of groups classified as Health/Human service, which make up over 
43% of 501(c)(3)s. All health and human service delivery organizations, including 
family planning service providers, face formidable restrictions imposed by the tax code 
on their ability to undertake advocacy activity. Similar to other human service 
organizations, reproductive health NPOs face challenges in obtaining government 
funding, which has become an increasingly important part of their revenue over the past 
thirty years, and are heavily dependent on their tax exempt status for survival. Finally, 
family planning service providers share the same organizational structure—governed by 
boards, managed by Executive Directors, partially dependent on volunteer labor—as 
other human service organizations. 
These factors should help to ensure that the findings from this study are 
generalizable to other organizations within this segment of the third sector. The results 
should also be generalizable to any NPO that provides services that engender political 
opposition and which may, therefore, face restrictive policy environments. These groups 
are, of course, myriad, including AIDS/HIV service providers, halfway houses, sex 
offender treatment centers, and other providers of service to convicted persons, homeless 
shelters, some mental health services, and numerous others.  
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Data 
As noted in the previous chapter, data on the advocacy activities, expenditures, 
revenue, and personnel of nonprofit reproductive health service providers are gathered 
from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) within the Urban Institute. 
The NCCS compiles these data from information on the Form 990, provided to the 
Internal Revenue Service by all 501 (c)(3) organizations with more than $25,000 in 
annual revenue.  
Thus, data analyzed herein include only those organizations that filed a Form 990 
in 2001 and, as such, include no organizations that made less that $25,000 in that year. I 
do not believe that this sample truncation biases or significantly detracts from the 
substantive import of the estimates discussed below for two reasons. First, truncation on 
an independent variable, in this case organizational size, does not violate the 
assumptions of standard logistic regression, which is the estimator used herein.14 The 
omission of the smallest organizations also should not be of significant concern because, 
due to the minimal amount that these groups are able to spend on advocacy, they are not 
the organizations that policy makers are likely to be concerned with. With all of this 
                                                 
14 One potential exception to this claim may arise if the causal relationship between the variable of interest 
(policy environment) and the probability of advocacy is fundamentally different in organizations that are 
in and out of the sample. More specifically, if the policy environment has a much larger impact on the 
smallest organizations due to some unmeasured variable associated with size, then the estimated impact of 
policy on larger organizations included in the sample might be artificially large. Fortunately, it is possible 
to test for a different data generating process in out of sample organizations using data from those that are 
in the NCCS data. If the size of the policy variable impact is considerably larger for the smallest in sample 
organizations, it may suggest that something important and unique is happening in organizations that make 
less than $25,000 dollars. I test for this potential by including a multiplicative interaction between total 
revenue and the NARAL index in the model of advocacy activity. The measure is significant but indicates 
that the impact of the policy environment is actually greater in larger organizations. The substantive 
difference across the size variable is, however, essentially meaningless, with a one-standard deviation 
increase in revenue producing a .007 increase in the impact of the NARAL measure. I thank Gary King for 
the insight concerning potential bias and the suggestion of an appropriate test. 
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said, however, I wish to be clear that the sample used in subsequent analyses does not 
allow me to draw inference about the smallest of nonprofit service providers and 
emphasize that I am not attempting to do so. 
Before moving on to a discussion of operational choices, I want to take a moment 
to discuss the potential for measurement error in the data and the impact on subsequent 
analyses. As noted in Chapter III, there is no scholarly evidence that nonprofit 
organizations systematically distort the information that they report to the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS). Additionally, the ability of the IRS to investigate and sanction 
these organizations makes the likelihood of such behavior low. There is evidence, 
however, of arithmetic, omission, and attachment errors within the Form 990s, which 
seem to be spread uniformly across organizations of different sizes and which scholars 
have identified as random error (Krehely 2001). The NCCS has taken significant steps to 
identify and flag these errors, but nonetheless, it is highly likely that some random error 
remains the data.  
This random error is unproblematic, however, for two reasons. First, such error 
creates additional noise in the model, which inflates standard errors and biases estimates 
toward the null. Thus, remaining problems with the data are likely to produce type II, 
rather than type I errors. The remaining error is also not troublesome because it can be 
dealt with, in part, through the selection of multiple dependent variables. As noted 
below, this chapter measures the concept of “political activity” with three distinct 
indicators drawn from different portions of the Form 990. It is highly unlikely that an 
organization made similar errors in three different places. 
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Variables 
Dependent Variables. To test the proposed hypothesis, subsequent analyses 
include two models. The dependent variable in the first model is whether or not an 
organization has actually undertaken any type of advocacy activity. This is a 
dichotomous indicator coded 1 if an organization has undertaken education and public 
relations activities through grassroots efforts, collaborated with a 501 (c)(4) 
organization, directly lobbied legislators, or participated in any mix of these activities. 
The measure is coded 0 for all other organizations. This information is gathered from 
Part III, sections 6a and 6b of the Form 990. Of the 487 nonprofit reproductive health 
providers in the sample, 104 or 21.3% undertook some form of political activity. 
The dependent variable in the second model denotes whether the organization 
has declared itself to be an “h-elector.” This is a designation that organizations can 
choose if they wish to announce their intention to be politically active 501(c)(3) 
organizations. The variable is coded 1 for those organizations that answer affirmatively 
in section III question 1 regarding the intention to influence legislation and provide 
information regarding advocacy expenditures in part 6a of the Form 990.  All other 
organizations are coded as 0. Of the organizations in the sample, 16.1% designated 
themselves as h-electors. 
Independent Variables. The primary independent variables in subsequent 
analyses reflect the two motivations for political activity discussed above. First, Truman 
(1951) suggests organizations choose to enter the policy battle and become politically 
active only when the threat from governmental institutions is sufficient to justify the 
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potential costs of such activities. To capture the policy context that an organization is 
functioning within, I include an index of state-level reproductive health policies created 
by the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL). NARAL is the preeminent 
national interest group concerned with reproductive rights and, although they maintain a 
clear ideological position on issues of reproductive freedom, the use of measures created 
by such groups is widely accepted in the study of American politics.15  
The state scoring system developed by the NARAL is a weighted additive index 
of state-level reproductive health policies and provides the most comprehensive measure 
of the reproductive health policy environment within the states. The measure is available 
annually in a report published by the organization and entitled “Who decides: A State-
by-State Report on the Status of Women’s Reproductive Rights.” The ultimate purpose 
of the report is to “grade” states on their reproductive health policies along 13 
dimensions. “Grades” take on possible values of F to A. The variable included in 
subsequent models is a count ranging from a value of 1 for the most negative policy 
environment (F) to 12 for the most positive policy environment (A). I expect the 
measure to correlate negatively with probability of becoming politically active. 
Policies included in the calculation of the grades are: bans on reproductive health 
procedures, bans on the dissemination of reproductive health information or counseling, 
consent requirements for young or married women seeking an abortion, mandatory 
waiting periods, protections for insurance companies or HMOs that refuse to cover or 
refer reproductive health cases, physician-only restrictions on the provision of abortions, 
                                                 
15 See for example studies using measures created by Americans for Democratic Action and the League of 
Conservation Voters. 
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public funding of abortions, extra-legal protections against clinic violence, and several 
others. The rankings also include several nonpolicy components including existing 
legislative declarations and constitutional provisions for or against access to 
reproductive health. Final grades for each state are an index created from numeric scores 
based on the existence and the extensiveness of each item listed above.   
To clarify the grading scheme, I can draw a couple of examples from opposite 
ends of the scoring continuum. NARAL assigned Alabama a failing grade in 2001 
because the state had bans on certain reproductive health procedures, mandatory waiting 
periods, a counseling ban, a physician only restriction, a public funding restriction, a 
restriction on minors’ access to reproductive health, regulations for reproductive health 
service providers more stringent than those for other medical professionals, and no 
institutionalized protections against violence for reproductive health clients. 
Alternatively, California received an A because it did not ban any procedures or the 
dissemination of information, protected clinic patients against violence, publicly funded 
abortions and other reproductive health services, and offered more specific constitutional 
protections of a woman’s right to choose than does the federal constitution. 
In addition to the policy environment, measured herein using the NARAL index, 
I have argued that the political environment should influence the decision to advocate by 
nonprofit service providers. The interest group literature argues that groups are most 
likely to lobby their friends, and rational choice theory confirms that organizations will 
want to expend the resources on lobbying when they have the highest probability of 
success. Thus, I suggest that nonprofit organizations will be more likely to lobby in state 
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where there are more ideological allies for their position, creating a friendly political 
environment.  
I measure the political environment using the indicator of state-level ideology 
created by Berry et al. (1998). I choose to employ the Berry et al. state-level measure of 
citizen, rather than government, ideology in subsequent models for two reasons. First, it 
is a more appropriate measure in the context of this study of nonprofit advocacy. The 
citizen measure estimates an average ideology score for each state and year using the 
actual ideology of House of Representative incumbents (gauged by their congressional 
roll call voting scores) and an estimated ideology score for election challengers. Both 
incumbent and challenger ideologies are weighted by the support they received in the 
general election. The activities counted as advocacy in this study include not only the 
direct contacting of legislators, but also grass roots lobbying designed to change 
opinions among the mass public. Because these political activities are targeted at both 
governmental and nongovernmental actors, I believe that the broadest measure of the 
“political environment” is preferable.  
Second, I employ the citizen measure because it is a more direct and valid 
measure of state liberalism. The measure of government ideology does not calculate a 
different ideology score, but rather weights the citizen measure based on partisan factors. 
As a result, I believe that the government measure is prone to many of the same 
problems that accompany attempts to estimate the political environment using only party 
ID. For example, Georgia is assigned an intuitively plausible citizen liberalism score of 
36 for the year 2002, suggesting that it was considerably more conservative than the 
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average state.  In that same year, Republicans controlled the Governors Mansion and the 
Georgia state Senate, but Democrats controlled the House. Because of the weighting 
scheme employed in the calculation of the government liberalism measure, the state 
received a government ideology score of 72. In other words, according to that measure, 
Georgia was one standard deviation more liberal than the average state. This seemingly 
implausible finding leads me to doubt the validity of the government ideology measure 
and rely instead on the more transparent citizen liberalism score.  This measure ranges 
from 0 to 100, with higher values corresponding to more liberal states. Thus, I expect a 
positive relationship between the measure of liberalism and the probability of 
undertaking political activity. The variable was originally calculated through 1995, but 
the measure has been updated through 2003 and is available from the Inter-University 
Consortium at the University of Michigan.16 
Control Variables. In additional to key independent variables measuring the 
policy and political environments, subsequent models include variables designed to 
control for rival hypotheses posed in the existing literature on nonprofit advocacy. 
Traditionally, institutional theorists suggest that as organizations become more 
established, more professionalized, and more enmeshed within existing networks of 
funders and regulators they will be less likely to advocate. Alternatively, more recent 
scholarship emphasizing institutional characteristics suggests that higher levels of 
administrative capacity and professionalization actually increase the probability of 
advocacy (Berry 2003). To control for the potential influence of institutional factors, 
                                                 
16 Available at www.icpsr.umich.edu 
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whatever the direction, I include first an indicator of organizational size, measured as 
total annual revenue. I include two measures of professionalization including financial 
administrative capacity, measured as the percent of annual expenditures spent on the 
accounting function, and overall levels of staff professionalization, measured as the 
percent of total expenditures on full-time staff.  
The theory of resource dependence argues that the more government funds that 
an organization receives, the less likely it is to participate in advocacy activity (Kramer 
1985; Wolch 1990). There are, however, different types of government monies that each 
come with distinctly different restrictions and expectations. One must acknowledge these 
differences to comprehensively control for the potential influence of resource 
dependence. Thus subsequent models contain two measures of dependence, including 
the percent of total revenue that comes from government grants and the percent of total 
revenue that an organization receives from government contracts.  
Methods 
Because both dependent variables are dichotomous, I employ a logistic 
regression in subsequent analyses. I report robust standard errors corrected for clustering 
on state.17 As noted above, the truncation on the predictor variable of size does not 
violate the assumptions of this estimator. 
                                                 
17 These are calculated with the Huber/White estimator. 
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Findings and Discussion 
Table 4.1 presents the findings from the analysis of whether or not an NPO 
reproductive health provider engaged in any political activity in 2001. The first column 
contains standard logit coefficients, while the second column contains the change in the 
predicted probability given a one standard deviation shift in the independent variable 
when the other predictor variables are held at their means. I will begin by discussing the 
primary variables of interest, which provide considerable evidence for hypotheses 
regarding the impact of policy and political environments on the decision to advocate.  
The NARAL index of state reproductive health policy is significantly related to 
the probability of engaging in political activity and in the expected direction, as is the 
measure of state-level political ideology. The figures in the second column suggest that a 
one standard deviation increase in the restrictiveness of the policy environment is 
associated with a 0.05 increase in the probability of a nonprofit organization undertaking 
political activity. Similarly, a one standard deviation shift in liberalism is associated with 
a 0.04 increase in the likelihood that an organization will become politically active.  
Turning to the variables suggested by existing theories of nonprofit advocacy, the 
findings appear somewhat inconsistent with theory. Interestingly, the findings do not 
provide consistent support for institutional or resource dependence explanations for 
political activity among NPOs. While the percent of revenue generated through  
government contracts is significantly related to the probability of an organization being 
politically active, it is not in the expected direction. Instead, the findings indicate that a 
higher reliance on government funds actually increases the probability of a reproductive 
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health provider being politically active. The findings also do not provide evidence for 
traditional institutional theories of advocacy, although they do support Berry’s (2003) 
expectations. Financial capacity and organizational size as measured by total 
expenditures are also positively related to the likelihood of declaring an attempt to 
influence legislation. As the predicted probabilities indicate, the substantive impact for 
this variable is quite large, with a one-standard deviation increase in revenue correlating 
with a .14 increase in the likelihood of being politically active. 
Table 4.2 presents the findings from the model analyzing an organization’s 
decision to declare itself as an h-elector. As with the previous table, the first column 
contains standard logit coefficients, while the second column contains the change in 
predicted probabilities. Again, the variables of interest measuring policy and political 
context are significant and in the expected direction. Looking at the second column, an 
increase of one standard deviation in the restrictiveness of the policy environment is 
associated with an increase of 0.04 of the likelihood that an organization will declare its 
intention to be politically active. Turning to the political environment, a one standard 
deviation increase in state liberalism is also associated with an increase of 0.04 in the 
probability of identifying as an h-elector. As in the previous analysis, the findings do not 
provide consistent support for existing theories of nonprofit advocacy. The proportion of 
revenue comprised by government grants is associated with an increase in the 
probability that a nonprofit organization openly declare its intention to be politically 
active, which is contrary to the expectations produced by resource dependence theory. 
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Table 4.1    Determinants of Political Activity Among Nonprofit Reproductive 
Health Service Providers, 2001 
 
 
Independent Variables Unstandardized Coefficients ∆ in Predicted Prob. 
 
Policy Environment   -.081***             -.05 
              (2.29) 
 
Political Environment    .023***    .04 
             (2.69) 
 
Government Contracts            1.718***    .04 
              (2.89)  
 
Government Grants               .488     --- 
              (1.36) 
 
Staff Professionalization           -2.334                --- 
              (1.56) 
 
Administrative Capacity         -10.403                --- 
              (0.99) 
 
Total Expenditures            1.47e-07*    .14 
             (1.83) 
 
Constant            -2.452     --- 
             (5.32)  
 
   
N = 487 
Wald 2χ = 83.17 
Percent Correctly Predicted = 81.52% 
Proportionate Reduction in Error (over modal category)= .192 
 
Numbers in parentheses are z-scores calculated with robust standard errors corrected for clustering on 
state. 
(*p>.05, **p>.001, ***p>.0001, one-tailed test) 
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Table 4.2    Determinants of Self-Designation as an H-elector Among Nonprofit 
Reproductive Health Service Providers, 2001 
 
 
Independent Variables Unstandardized Coefficients ∆ in Predicted Prob. 
 
Policy Environment   -.068*              -.04 
              (1.85) 
 
Political Environment    .028***    .04 
             (2.63) 
 
Government Contracts              .738     --- 
              (0.70)  
 
Government Grants               .852***    .03 
             (2.47) 
 
Staff Professionalization           -2.838**             -.04 
              (2.00) 
 
Administrative Capacity         -27.491                --- 
              (1.56) 
 
Total Expenditures            1.34e-07*    .09 
             (1.75) 
 
Constant            -2.98     --- 
             (5.22)  
 
   
N = 487 
Wald 2χ = 40.41 
Percent Correctly Predicted = 84.19% 
Proportionate Reduction in Error (over modal category)= .123 
Numbers in parentheses are z-scores calculated with robust standard errors corrected for clustering on 
state. 
(*p>.05, **p>.001, ***p>.0001, one-tailed test) 
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Findings regarding institutional explanations for advocacy are mixed, supporting 
both sets of expectations found in the literature. The size and capacity of the 
organization, as measured by total revenue, is positively and significantly related to the 
probability of self-identifying as an h-elector, as Berry (2003) would expect. 
Alternatively, the proportion of expenditures on fulltime personnel is significant and 
negatively related to the probability of openly declaring political activity, which is what 
a traditional institutional story would suggest. 
Conclusions 
This chapter began with the argument that conditions in the policy and political 
environments motivate nonprofit service providers to undertake political activity. To test 
these assertions, I model the expressed intention to influence legislation, as well as 
actual participation in any of several types of advocacy. The findings from those 
analyses suggest that there are consistent relationships between policy and politics and 
the political activity of nonprofit service providers. Additionally, the analyses draw into 
question the usefulness of explanations for political activity offered by previous theories 
of nonprofit advocacy. Measures of institutionalization and resource dependence prove 
to be inconsistent predictors of measures of political activity.  
The consistent influence of policy and politics on the decision to advocate, along 
with the inconsistent influence of organizational explanations, provides evidence for the 
utility of the theoretical approach to advocacy suggested by this dissertation. Drawing on 
recent work on organizational strategy, I have suggested that advocacy be conceived as a 
two-stage process where organizations first define broad goals in response to 
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environmental conditions and, second, choose among actions to implement those goals 
based on available organizational resources. More specifically, I argue that nonprofit 
service providers decide to advocate when the policy environment restricts their ability 
to deliver services and choose among specific advocacy activities based on levels of 
organizational capacity and the diversity of the resource base. The findings from this 
chapter confirm that the first stage of the process—the decision to advocate—is 
associated with the policy and political environments. They also indicate that it does not 
seem to be related to capacity or funding variables. The next chapter tests the assertion 
that these are, however, important factors in the second stage of the advocacy process—
the choice among specific advocacy activities. 
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CHAPTER V 
STRATEGIES OF NONPROFIT ADVOCACY 
 
Introduction 
 
Borrowing from previous scholarship on organizational strategy, this dissertation 
argues that strategy formulation is a two-stage decision in which organizations must first 
decide whether or not to undertake political activity through advocacy or lobbying and 
then choose among the set of strategic actions that are available to them. I suggest that 
the initial decision to advocate is a strategic stance taken by nonprofit organizations in 
policy environments that necessitate such activity and political environments in which 
they have a sufficient number of allies. Chapter IV tests these assertions and the findings 
suggest that there are consistent relationships between policy and politics and the 
political activity of nonprofit organizations.  
In this chapter, I will explore the second stage of the decision-making process 
outlined above, where organizations must decide what specific activities they will 
undertake to achieve their desired political outcome. Boyne and Walker (2004) suggest 
that these strategic actions are those which will allow an organization to implement its 
strategic stance. In other words, once an organization determines that the environment in 
which it delivers services requires the strategic stance of advocacy, it must decide 
whether to engage in collaboration with a 501(c)(4) organization, grassroots lobbying, 
directly lobbying legislators or some combination of these activities. These are the 
primary activities available to NPOs for changing policies or opinion and securing 
collective goods (Jenkins 1987; Salamon 1994; Berry 2003).  
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Theory of Strategic Actions 
According to Boyne and Walker (2004) there are three levels of strategy 
formulation. These include the selection of primary missions and objectives, formulation 
of broad strategies to address environmental constraints on those objectives, and finally 
the selection of specific actions in the implementation of those strategies. The authors 
suggest that the levels of the framework are hierarchical, with each necessarily preceding 
the next. The third stage, strategic actions, is the focus of this chapter. These are, 
according to these authors, “the specific actions that organizations may use to 
operationalize their stance” (Boyne and Walker 2004, 241). In other words, once an 
organization has decided that the environment necessitates a certain course of action 
(strategic stance), it must determine the specific activities that will help it to pursue that 
course most effectively. This section develops general theoretical expectations about the 
factors that determine the choice among strategies by organizations, before applying 
these insights to the choice of advocacy strategies by nonprofit service providers.  
The strategic actions discussed by Boyne and Walker (2004) and the advocacy 
activities that are available to nonprofit service providers are similar to what the social 
movement organizations (SMO) literature refers to as tactics (McAdam, McCarthy, and 
Zald 1996; Jasper 1997; Dalton 1994; Tilly 1979). SMO scholars suggest that 
organizations have a varying repertoire of tactics available to them at any time (Tilly 
1979), but that these groups do not typically use all of the tactics that are available to 
them. The literature outlines a set of resources and constraints that determine the 
selection of tactics among SMOs. I suggest that this scholarship, when combined with 
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insights from the literature on nonprofit organizational behavior, provides a useful 
framework for understanding strategic actions in NPOs. 
The Social Movement Organization literature suggests that groups adopt a 
“strategy of actions,” which is constrained by resources, ideology, and the image that an 
organization wishes to portray (Dalton 1994). One of the most consistent features in 
studies of SMOs and protest groups is the assertion that group and member resources are 
powerful factors in decisions about tactics. Ennis (1987) argues that a group must choose 
a “field of action” that is not only consistent with its ideology and image, but also 
feasible given its financial and membership resource bases. Similarly, Meyer (1999: 30) 
argues that “with regard to resources, a well-endowed organization has more options for 
tactics than a poorly financed one.”  
This literature also asserts that the type of resources to which an organization has 
access is an important predictor of tactic choice. The research on social movement 
organizations suggests that organizations that are heavily dependent on government 
monies are more likely to resist selecting tactics that might damage their funding 
relationships (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). Groups with a diverse resource 
base, in contrast, appear less constrained to choose from the variety of available tactics.  
The literature on SMOs also points out that, along with the differences in actual 
costs associated with different strategies, there are also different opportunity costs for 
each. Specifically, different tactics may alienate important funders to a greater or lesser 
degree and, therefore, have different consequences for the continued receipt of needed 
funds. Organizations in an SMO’s network develop rules of conduct and behavior that 
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help to define acceptable activities and, the more closely an organization adheres to 
these rules, the more likely it is to be able to mobilize constituents and resources, which 
in turn ensures the survival of the organization (Snow and Benford 1988).  
The arguments concerning the choice of tactics among social movement 
organizations are similar to those made in the literature on behavior in nonprofit 
organizations. Specifically, scholars therein suggest that dependence on government 
resources constrains the behavior of NPOs that fear the loss of such funding (Beck 1970; 
Manser 1974; Kramer 1985; Wolch 1990). Additionally, previous work on nonprofits 
indicates that institutional norms, determined by organizational size, maturity, and 
professionalization  also govern organizational behavior. As noted in Chapter II, there is 
some disagreement among scholars as to the direction of this relationship as it relates 
specifically to advocacy. Some scholars suggest a negative relationship with established 
organizations being unwilling to participate in political activity, while others suggest a 
positive relationship as increased capacity makes organizations more willing to engage 
in the policy debate (Berry 2003). 
I have argued in this dissertation that these resource dependence and institutional 
explanations for NPO behavior are insufficient to explain advocacy activity in its 
entirety because they fail to take account of the political environment in which 
organizations deliver services. Indeed, the analyses in Chapter IV demonstrate that 
policy and politics have a consistent impact on the decision by reproductive health 
providers to become politically active, while these traditional predictors did not.  
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The purpose of this chapter, however, is to explore the choice among activities 
once an organization has already decided to become politically active. Thus, resource 
dependence and institutional theories of organizational behavior seem more intuitively 
applicable here, where the influence of the political environment has already been 
“controlled for” in the choice of an advocacy strategic stance. In other words, once an 
organization has decided to become politically active, it is reasonable to assert that it 
may choose among available actions based on type and availability of funding and 
institutionally determined norms and expectations. The insights from the large literature 
on tactics in social movement organizations reaffirm the plausibility of these 
relationships and further suggest that resources and institutional factors should be 
important predictors of advocacy activities. 
Before generating specific hypotheses, I will review the specific advocacy 
activities or actions available to nonprofit service providers. The argument that resource 
and institutional factors may influence the choice among strategies rests on the 
assumption that these strategies have different costs. Thus, the subsequent review will 
emphasize the differences between advocacy activities in terms of actual and opportunity 
costs, including the potential loss of tax exempt status, government funding, and donor 
support. 
Advocacy Tactics and Costs Associated with Each 
Once an organization has decided that it will undertake advocacy the 
organization must decide among available tactics. An organization will, however, incur 
different costs or risks based on the activity or activities that it chooses. There are a 
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variety of costs or risks associated with advocacy that are unique to 501(c)(3) 
organizations and several that any interest group faces.  
Grassroots lobbying includes the dissemination of materials and activities 
designed to garner public support; it is an attempt to influence policy by changing public 
opinion. Alternatively, direct lobbying activities are targeted at city, state, and national 
elected officials in an effort to compel them to take more actions that benefit the client 
groups of the nonprofit organizations.  Finally, collaboration is defined as mutual 
agreements and exchanges of aid between service providers and organizations with 
similar missions or with missions targeted at protecting and benefiting the clients that the 
NPO serves. This activity often includes affiliating with 501 (c)(4) organizations, which 
are allowed to participate in direct lobbying without limitation. I rely heavily on Ried 
(1999) for these descriptions. 
Scholarship suggests that each of these activities can pose a threat to the 
continued receipt of needed resources and may conflict with institutional norms of 
organizational maintenance. First, Berry (2003) suggests that the managers and directors 
of NPOs perceive advocacy to be a potential threat to their organizations’ crucial tax 
exempt status. Additionally, there is a long-standing argument in the nonprofit literature 
that advocacy is costly to NPOs because it threatens the acquisition of government 
resources upon which these organizations have come to depend (Beck 1970; Manser 
1974; Kramer 1985; Wolch 1990).  These authors suggest that some of these 
organizations will advocate less aggressively to avoid the loss of government funding. 
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In addition, advocacy represents a departure from the core mission of these 
organizations. Facing perpetually limited resources, political activity often means a 
diversion of funds away from service provision, which is the raison d’etre for these 
organizations (Boris and Krehely 2002). NPOs, including family planning/reproductive 
health service providers depend heavily on private donations and fee-for-service revenue 
for their survival. If excessive lobbying and policy oriented activity detract sufficiently 
from service provision, these funding streams may well be threatened. This in turn may 
make it difficult to stave off organizational entropy. 
Interestingly, there is a large literature on interest groups that makes these same 
claims. Specifically, the studies concerned with organizational maintenance among 
membership groups suggests that lobbying and policy oriented activity are only two of 
the services that members expect from the groups that they join. If that activity 
sufficiently curtails the other benefits that members hope to receive, organizational 
mortality may occur (See Browne 1988; Olson 1965). Research of this type suggests that 
managers are rightfully preoccupied with organizational maintenance (Salisbury 1969). 
Similarly, they suggest that: 
Organizational maintenance is a fact of life all group 
leaders confront. For the majority of interest group 
entrepreneurs, who depend on constituent dues as a prime 
funding source, maintenance dictates the need to keep 
members contributing. The key to creating a successful 
organization can be summarized simply: entice potential 
members to join, keep attrition below the rate at which 
replacements can be found, and establish a core 
membership. (Rothenberg 1988) 
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Institutional theories of nonprofit behavior suggest that as organizations become more 
established and professionalized it is these core mission and support retention functions 
that become most salient. In turn, activities that may detract from these functions, such 
as aggressive advocacy, may be curtailed (Hall 1987). 
In addition to its consequences for tax exempt status, government funding, and 
organizational maintenance, advocacy is likely to produce additional political opponents 
for a service provision organization. At least, it is likely to galvanize those that already 
exist. In a recent symposium on nonprofit advocacy, Saidel (2002) argued that 
successful advocacy was particularly dangerous for these organizations, suggesting that 
NPOs who show the initiative and ability to influence policy will invite additional 
external scrutiny from opponents. If those opponents have a powerful voice in 
governmental decision-making, the author suggested that such organizations may 
experience a reduction in grant awards. Again, institutional theories of nonprofit 
behavior suggest that organizations will try to avoid such scrutiny when possible 
(Bernstein 1991). 
Although all advocacy activities can pose risks to NPOs, not all available 
strategies are equally risky. As noted above, service providers, in this case family 
planning service providers, have a number of advocacy strategies from which they can 
choose, including creation of or collaboration with 501(c)(4) organizations, grass roots 
lobbying, and direct lobbying. This section will argue that these represent ascending 
costs for 501(c)(3) service providers because of the differing threats that each poses to 
the organization’s tax exempt status and the continued receipt of government funding, as 
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well as the different levels of political exposure to critics and diversion of resources 
from other core activities that each entails.  
Of the available advocacy strategies, affiliation with a 501(c)(4) is the least 
problematic. This is the strategy that the federal government suggests for those 501(c)(3) 
organizations that wish to lobby more than the law allows (Hopkins 1992). The 
government places limited restrictions on 501(c)(4)s, requiring only that they do not 
engage in openly partisan activities, but donations to these groups are not tax deductible. 
In Reagan v. Taxation Without Representation (1983), the Supreme Court ruled that the 
pursuit of advocacy activity through a 501(c)(4) was legal and could not threaten a 
501(c)(3)’s tax exempt status. The court, and current IRS regulations, only require that 
(c)(3)s report a relationship with a (c)(4) on their form 990. Interestingly, these 
organizations can be imbedded within one another, with one staff person receiving two 
paychecks for (c)(3) and (c)(4) activities (Berry 2003). 
Grassroots lobbying is the next most dangerous strategy for 501(c)(3) nonprofit 
organizations. Among scholars, these activities typically include the dissemination of 
political materials designed to garner public support, the education of citizens regarding 
policy, and activities that encourage citizens to contact legislators or administrators with 
their policy concerns (Cruz 2001). Other types of grass roots activities include mass 
mailings, rallies, and even demonstrations, all of which are targeted at shifting public 
support for the organization. The 1976 Tax Reform Act, capped the expenditure limits for 
these activities at 25% of the total amount of money that an organization spends on 
direct lobbying, but it did not precisely define those activities that can be paid for with 
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grassroots lobbying expenditures and those that cannot (Smucker 1999). Thus, there is 
no precise statutory definition of acceptable grassroots activities (Raffa 2000). 
This ambiguity reduces the risk for those nonprofits that wish to carry out this 
type of activity. So long as they are careful not to exceed the expenditure cap, an IRS 
audit of a group’s grassroots lobbying activities is unlikely to result in a revocation of its 
tax exempt status because it is difficult to determine from the language of the tax code 
which activities are prohibited. Most importantly, some of the executive directors who 
make advocacy decisions in these organizations are aware of the latitude within the law 
and exploit it to their advantage. One of the directors interviewed by Berry (2003) said 
that his group actively encourages citizens to contact legislators, but does not tell them to 
urge the legislator to vote in a particular way. Thus, they do not count this activity as 
grassroots lobbying. Another interviewee identified much of the activity that his group 
engaged in as “research and technical assistance” to those wishing to lobby the 
legislature, and argued that this did not fall under the purview of the 1976 regulations.18 
If the ambiguous definition of grassroots activity in the tax code reduces the 
dangers associated with this strategy, it is the clarity concerning what constitutes direct 
lobbying that makes this the most risky of advocacy activities. The 1976 Act stipulated 
that an organization with an annual budget of $500,000 or less could spend 20% of total 
income on direct lobbying. The proportion steadily decreases for organizations with 
                                                 
18 There is no evidence in the literature, nor any other reason to believe, that some types of organizations 
will systematically use these alternative classification schemes more than others. Thus, the degree to 
which NPOs take advantage of the ambiguity in the 1976 statute when reporting activities to the IRS 
constitutes random error in the dependent variable. The effect of this error should be to bias the findings 
toward the null and, thus, present a more demanding test of my hypotheses. 
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additional assets, setting the limit at 5% plus $250,000 for those organizations with 
budgets of $1.5 million or greater. The 1976 act continued to utilize the narrow 
definition of direct lobbying that had originally been articulated in the 1934 Revenue 
Act, which was the first congressional attempt to statutorily define NPO advocacy. The 
Act defined direct lobbying as the act of contacting elected officials in an attempt to 
influence policy (Smucker 1999). The changes to the law enacted in 1976 relaxed the 
limitations on direct lobbying slightly by identifying eight exceptions where NPOs could 
have contact with legislators and not have it count as lobbying, but remained clear about 
the activities that were limited by tax code restrictions on direct lobbying. 
The precise definitions established in statute, along with the paper trail left 
during the process of making appointments with and meeting with elected officials, 
makes direct lobbying the easiest type of activity for regulators to observe. This means 
that direct lobbying poses inherently more risk to an organization’s tax exempt status 
when compared to ambiguously defined grass roots activity. Additionally, direct 
lobbying of government is a higher profile activity that draws more attention to an 
organization than does grassroots activity or collaboration. This attention often serves as 
the impetus for attacks from other interest groups with opposing views (Boris and 
Krehely 2002). It may also provoke additional scrutiny from regulators and political 
opponents. One of the executive directors interviewed by Berry (2003) said plainly, 
“take a public position critical of a state agency and the next day you get an audit of your 
records” (Berry 2003, 74). Another, told of “irritating” Senator Phil Gramm in testimony 
before his committee and getting a visit from the Inspector General of the IRS soon 
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after. Finally, direct lobbying can be the most costly activity in terms of resources, 
whether human or monetary. In many cases, access to legislators requires more 
volunteer time, travel expenditures, and possibly the employment of a professional 
public affairs director. 
Thus, I suggest that direct lobbying is the most open and aggressive strategy 
available to NPOs that choose to advocate and, as a result, brings the greatest exposure 
to the organization and poses the greatest threat to tax exempt status and the continued 
receipt of government monies. Alternatively, collaboration with a 501(c)(4) is the most 
passive and safest strategy available to these organizations.  
If we conceive of advocacy strategies on a continuum from passive to aggressive, 
it is also possible to place organizations along that continuum based the number of 
strategies that they adopt. The interest group literature suggests that the most 
“successful” organizations, in terms of affecting policy, adopt multiple tactics (See 
Baumgartner and Leech 1996). When they are able to do so, politically active nonprofit 
organizations should also desire to take advantage of all the strategies available to them. 
In other words, an NPO aggressively attempting to change policy might lobby legislators 
directly, engage in a grass-roots education program designed to shift public opinion, and 
collaborate with a likeminded organization whose advocacy expenditures are 
unrestricted. The adoption of multiple strategies is not without cost, however, as each 
additional tactic brings greater exposure to the organization and may be perceived as an 
additional move away from core missions. 
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Hypotheses 
The discussion presented above suggests a set of empirically testable hypotheses 
regarding the choice of advocacy strategies by nonprofit organizations. According to 
resource dependence theory and studies of social movement organizations, organizations 
that are more dependent on government resources will be less likely to undertake actions 
which create exposure or are critical of the government, lest they risk losing government 
largess. As such, I expect that organizations that depend of the government for a higher 
proportion of total revenue will be less likely to engage in aggressive advocacy tactics, 
such as direct lobbying.  Additionally, I expect that organizations which receive higher 
proportions of their revenue from government contracts and government grants will be 
less likely to use the full range of advocacy tactics available to them.  
Institutional theories of NPO and SMO behavior also suggest a relationship 
between organizational size and professionalization and the aggressiveness of advocacy 
activity. Traditional work argues that the norms of behavior in large and well established 
organizations will make them more focused on service delivery and organizational 
maintenance and less likely to undertake activity that will bring regulatory scrutiny that 
could jeopardize those goals.  Thus, it suggests that larger and more professionalized 
organizations that choose to be politically active will be less likely to employ aggressive 
strategies such as direct lobbying and less likely to engage in multiple advocacy 
activities.  
In contrast with the traditional literature, however, recent scholarship on 
nonprofit advocacy suggests that organizations that have more capacity, 
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professionalization, and administrative capacity are better able to understand the full 
array of advocacy strategies available to them, as well as the laws restricting these 
activities (Berry 2003). Such organizations will be more adept at filing expenditure 
reports, less fearful of the more aggressive tactics that are available, and more educated 
about the laws limiting advocacy. This line of reasoning suggests the alternative 
hypothesis that large and professionalized organizations will be more likely to engage in 
aggressive activities such as direct lobbying and more likely to use all available 
advocacy strategies.  Because there is no conclusive empirical evidence favoring one 
institutional perspective over the other, I offer both as plausible explanations for the 
strategic actions of politically active NPOs. 
Variables and Methods 
Data 
I test these hypotheses about the choice of advocacy strategies among NPOs that 
have chosen to become politically active in an analysis of nonprofit reproductive health 
service providers in 2001. As noted in the previous chapter, data on the advocacy 
activities, expenditures, revenue, and personnel of nonprofit reproductive health service 
providers are gathered from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) within 
the Urban Institute. The NCCS compiles these data from information on the Form 990, 
provided to the Internal Revenue Service by all 501 (c)(3) organizations with more than 
$25,000 in annual revenue. In addition, the information as to whether or not an 
organization chooses to collaborate with a 501(c)(4) organization, participate in 
grassroots lobbying, or to directly lobby legislators is found on the IRS Form 990. This 
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information was coded separately by the author for each organization in the data set. 
Data analyzed herein include Form 990 information from 2001. 
Methods 
Because the primary research question in this chapter asks, once an organization 
has decided to advocate, how does it choose among available advocacy strategies, a 
potential selection bias problem exists. In other words, some organizations have self 
selected out of the sample by choosing not to advocate. More importantly, the selection 
pattern is not random, but rather varies predictably with identifiable factors, such as the 
policy environment. Treating organizations that select out of the sample as missing will 
likely bias estimates for those organizations that do advocate, unless we take account of 
the information that we have on non-advocating NPOs and the reasons for their choice.  
The appropriate estimator in such instances is a selection model. Because the 
dependent variables here are categorical, I employ a Heckman estimator that fits a 
maximum likelihood probit model with sample selection. The model takes advantage of 
information from the organizations not participating in advocacy to improve the 
estimates of the parameters and provide consistent, asymptotically efficient estimates for 
all parameters. 
Variables 
Dependent Variables. The dependent variables in subsequent models capture 
the aggressiveness with which nonprofit reproductive health service providers engage in 
advocacy. The sample in these models, and thus the measurement of the dependent 
variables, is limited to politically active organizations. The first measures aggressiveness 
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based on the relative risks posed by each individual strategy. As such, the variable is a 
dichotomous indicator coded 1 for those organizations that engage in direct lobbying and 
0 for those organizations that restrict their activities to grass-roots lobbying or 
collaboration. The second indicator of aggressiveness captures the increased risks 
associated with the adoption of each additional advocacy strategy. This, too, is a 
dichotomous measure coded 1 for those organizations that employ all three available 
strategies and 0 for those that limit themselves to one or two tactics. 
These indicators only correlate with one another at r = .316. Thus, I am confident 
that they measure different dimensions of the aggressiveness with which politically 
active nonprofit service providers pursue advocacy. 
Independent Variables. The independent variables used in the analyses here are 
identical to those included in the previous chapter’s models and this section offers only a 
brief review of those operational choices. The first stage of the Heckman models 
presented below, predicting the likelihood that an organization will be politically active, 
includes the significant predictors from the relevant model in Chapter IV. The second 
stage of the equation, modeling the choice among strategies for organizations that 
remain in the sample, includes all relevant predictors, including measures of resource 
dependence and institutional factors. Second stage models also include measures of the 
policy and political environments to provide a direct test of the argument made 
throughout this dissertation that the decision to become politically active and the choice 
among strategies are driven by different factors. 
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To measure the potential influence of institutional factors, whatever the direction, 
I include first an indicator of organizational size, measured as total annual revenue. I 
include two measures of professionalization including financial administrative capacity, 
measured as the percent of annual expenditures spent on the accounting function, and 
overall levels of staff professionalization, measured as the percent of total expenditures 
on full-time staff. Subsequent models contain two measures of dependence on 
government funding, including the percent of total revenue that comes from government 
grants and the percent of total revenue that an organization receives from government 
contracts.  Models contain the NARAL index of state-level reproductive health policies 
as an indicator of the policy environment in which these organizations deliver services. 
They also include the measure of state government ideology developed by Berry et al. 
(1998) as a measure of the political environment in which service providers will be 
engaging in advocacy. 
Findings and Discussion 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 present the findings from the first and second stage of the 
selection models respectively. The first table contains models of the determinants of 
political activity among nonprofit reproductive health providers, which are similar to the 
commensurate model in Chapter IV. The second stage models explore the factors that 
influence strategy choice among politically active groups, with the model of high risk 
strategy adoption in the first column and the model of multiple strategy adoption in the 
second. The tables are presented together because, in some cases, the interpretation of 
the findings is enhanced by examining both simultaneously. 
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Table 5.1       First-Stage Selection Equations for Models of Strategy Choice Among 
Nonprofit Reproductive Health Service Providers, 2001 
 
 
Independent Variables  Model 1   Model 2 
    Strategy Aggressiveness  Number of Strategies 
 
Policy Environment     -.039**      -.038** 
     (2.32)     (2.33) 
 
Political Environment      .013***       .013*** 
     (2.76)     (2.65) 
 
Government Grants      .358*       .380* 
     (1.77)     (1.82) 
 
Government Contracts   1.231***      1.256*** 
     (3.44)     (3.84) 
 
Total Revenue     6.27e-08***      6.26e-08*** 
(2.44) (2.45) 
 
Constant    -1.540       -1.551 
(5.89) (6.09) 
 
z-scores in parentheses calculated with robust standard errors corrected for clustering on state. 
(*p>.05, **p>.001, ***p>.0001, one-tailed test) 
  
105
Table 5.2       Second-Stage Equations for Models of Strategy Choice Among 
Nonprofit Reproductive Health Service Providers, 2001 
 
 
Independent Variables  Model 1   Model 2 
    Strategy Aggressiveness  Number of Strategies 
 
Policy Environment     -.070        .006 
     (1.30)     (0.13) 
 
Political Environment      .008       -.009 
     (0.56)     (1.19) 
 
Government Grants      .559       -.602 
     (0.65)     (1.01) 
 
Government Contracts  -1.332*    -1.513*** 
(1.71)                                       (2.45) 
 
Staff Professionalization    -.917         .374  
(0.45) (0.31) 
 
Administrative Capacity          -35.661*       -5.906 
               (1.75)       (0.37)  
 
Total Revenue     1.56e-08      3.32e-09 
(0.61)                                       (0.09) 
 
Constant     1.140        1.479 
(1.01)                                         (3.12) 
 
     N = 487       N = 487 
     Censored = 383      Censored = 383 
     Wald X2 = 14.44      Wald X2 = 18.51
         Prob>X2 = .044      Prob>X2 = .009
   
 
z-scores in parentheses calculated with robust standard errors corrected for clustering on state. 
(*p>.05, **p>.001, ***p>.0001, one-tailed test) 
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The first variables of interest are the measures of the policy and political environments. 
Both fail to reach statistical significance in the models of strategy choice, while both are 
strong predictors of the likelihood of becoming politically active.19 This finding provides 
evidence for the general argument, made throughout this dissertation, that the choice to 
become politically active and the choice among advocacy strategies are distinct and 
driven by different factors. The policy environment in which an organization delivers 
services and the political environment in which it must advocate help to determine 
whether or not it engages in political activity. Once it has made that choice, however, it 
appears as if these environmental factors no longer have a significant impact on the 
specific tactics which the organization employs in pursuit of its strategic stance. 
I turn now to the individual second-stage models. The findings in the first 
column of Table 5.2 suggest that institutional and resource factors help to determine the 
likelihood that an organization will choose the most aggressive individual strategy—
direct lobbying. The measure of financial or accounting capacity is significant at the .05 
level on a 1-tailed test and in the expected direction, indicating that as organizations 
become more professionalized they are less likely to directly lobby legislators. The 
baseline probability for adopting this strategy is .357, but a one standard deviation 
increase in the professionalization measure reduces this probability to .240. 
Organizations that are two standard deviations above the mean on this indicator have a 
                                                 
19 The coefficients across the first stage equations are slightly different due to the differing shapes of the 
likelihood functions in the second stage models, but, as Table 1 indicates, the substantive findings are 
identical. 
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.148 probability of directly lobbying legislators, indicating a greater than 50% reduction 
in the likelihood of adopting the most aggressive tactic.  
This finding provides some evidence for a traditional institutional theoretical 
story, where professionalized organizations focus more heavily on service provision and 
organizational maintenance. The models in Chapter IV suggested that these factors did 
not make NPOs any more or less likely to become politically active. It appears, however, 
that among organizations that do engage in the policy debate, those that are more 
professionalized may limit themselves to less aggressive strategies. This conclusion 
must, of course, be drawn cautiously in light of the fact only one of the two measures of 
professionalization proved to be a significant predictor. 
The results from the first model also suggest that increased dependence on 
government resources among nonprofit reproductive health providers has an impact on 
the likelihood of adopting aggressive advocacy strategies. The measure of government 
contracts is negative and significant, indicating that as the percent of total revenue 
generated by providing services for the government increases, the likelihood of directly 
lobbying legislators for policy change decreases. A one standard deviation increase in 
the measure of contracts reduces the probability of adopting the most aggressive strategy 
from .357 to .287. Those organizations that receive the majority of their revenue from 
government contracts have only a .15 probability of undertaking direct lobbying. 
Turning to the model of multiple strategy adoption, the measure of resource 
dependence is again significant and in the expected direction. As the percent of total 
revenue from government contracts increases, the findings suggest that the likelihood of 
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employing all three available advocacy strategies decreases. The baseline probability of 
an organization engaging in direct and grass-roots lobbying, as well as collaborating 
with a 501(c)(4) is .276. A one standard deviation increase in the percent of total revenue 
garnered from the provision of government contracts reduces that probability to .214. 
Organizations that rely on such activities for a majority of their revenues have less than a 
.10 probability of using all available advocacy tactics.20 
The consistent findings regarding the negative impact of government contracts 
on the choice of advocacy strategies accord well with resource dependence theories from 
the nonprofit and social movement organization literatures. They are an almost perfect 
fit with Kramer’s (1985) concept of “vendorism,” which suggests that NPOs 
increasingly find their primary role to be the contracted provider of government services 
and that this relationship often results in the “cooptation and dilution of advocacy 
activity” (Kramer 1985: 380).  
The negative relationship between resource dependence and aggressiveness of 
advocacy is not the whole story, however, and here a simultaneous consideration of both 
stages of the selection model is useful. Doing so suggests that resource dependence has 
opposite effects, depending on the stage of the advocacy decision. Referring back to 
                                                 
20 In order to test the robustness of the findings to different operational choices, I also analyzed the 
likelihood of adopting the least risky strategy and the fewest number of strategies. In the first of these 
models, the dependent variable took on a value of 1 if an organization engaged only in collaboration with 
a 501(c)(4) and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in the second model was coded as a 1 if the NPO 
adopted only one available strategy and 0 otherwise. Model 2 included the same Stage 1 and Stage 2 
predictors as the model that appears in the text. The first model required a reduced form to converge, 
however, and included all Stage 1 and Stage 2 predictors except government grants. The substantive 
findings in Stage 2 of both models changed in a predictable manner given the different coding of the 
dependent variables. They suggest that the larger proportion of revenue that an organization receives from 
government contracts, the more likely it is to adopt only the least risk strategy of collaboration (p>.01) and 
the more likely it is to adopt only one of the available advocacy strategies (p>.05). 
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Table 5.1, the findings indicate that the percent of total revenue garnered from 
government contracts, as well as the proportion of revenue made up by government 
grants, are both positively related to the probability of a nonprofit reproductive health 
provider becoming politically active. Yet, once they have made the decision to do so, the 
degree to which these organizations are dependent on government resources correlates 
negatively with the aggressiveness of the political strategies they adopt. 
These mixed findings may help to explain an anomaly in the nonprofit literature 
concerned with resource dependence. As noted above and in previous chapters, 
theoretical studies have long asserted that increased reliance on the government as a 
revenue source decreases their willingness and/or ability to criticize government. Recent 
empirical studies of advocacy activity have not, however, demonstrated a relationship 
between resource dependence and advocacy. Both Cruz (2001) and Berry (2003) 
conclude that there is no relationship between government funding and political activity 
for the organizations in their samples. The findings from this chapter suggest that these 
null findings may be due to the failure of previous studies to distinguish between the two 
stages of the advocacy decision for nonprofit organizations. 
Conclusions 
This chapter began with the assertion that, once an organization made the 
decision to undertake political activity, it must decide among available advocacy 
strategies. More specifically, I argue that the decision among tactics is dependent on 
resources and institutional influences. To test these arguments, I model the decision to 
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undertake aggressive political activity such as direct lobbying, as well as the decision to 
undertake multiple advocacy strategies. 
The findings suggest that there is a relationship between government monies and 
a decrease not only in the aggressiveness of advocacy but also in the use of multiple 
advocacy strategies. As noted above, this is in keeping with the expectations offered in 
the resource dependence literature. The results suggest only a tenuous relationship, 
however, between institutional variables such as professionalization and the decision on 
how aggressive an organization will be in their choice of strategies. To the degree that 
this finding supports a theoretical story, it provides evidence for the traditional 
institutional approach to nonprofit behavior, rather than the more recent theoretical 
expectations offered by Berry (2003). 
Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that recent work from organizational 
strategy suggests that the advocacy decision made by nonprofit organizations is a multi-
stage process. This chapter provides evidence for this assertion, in that the relationship 
between the policy and political environment, while related to the decision to undertake 
advocacy is not associated with the choice among available strategies. Similarly, the 
analysis here suggests that dependence on government resources has two opposing 
effects on organizations, depending on whether they are deciding to become politically 
active, or choosing the strategy or number of strategies that they will employ. These 
findings may clarify some of the mixed findings in previous studies which do not model 
the difference between the decision to advocate and the choice among strategies. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Introduction 
The nonprofit sector is large and varied, consisting of numerous organizations 
that provide almost an endless array of service and activities. What distinguishes these 
organizations is that their primary goal is not making money or implementing public 
policy. While they do have to generate funds to survive, this is done in an effort to 
provide services to a typically underserved portion of the population. Similarly, while 
these organizations often provide such services for governments, they are autonomous 
and enter into these relationships voluntarily. These characteristics place nonprofit 
organizations in a separate third sector, which fills the space between the for-profit and 
governmental sectors of society.  
This arrangement generates a relationship between the sectors; particularly the 
governmental and nonprofit. The former provides extensive resource support to 
nonprofit service providers. All of these organizations receive indirect benefits such as 
tax exemptions, which are crucial to their survival. Many others are directly dependent 
on government for the resources that allow them to carry out their activities through “fee 
for service” arrangements such as Medicaid and Medicare.  
The relationship is not, however, completely harmonious. Governments use the 
tax exempt status of nonprofit organizations, as well as their prominent role as 
contractors, as a justification for limiting the autonomy of these groups in the political 
sphere. In response to concerns that tax exemptions amount to a government subsidy of 
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certain interests, which advantages them over others, legislators have constrained the 
amount and types of political activity in which tax exempt organizations can participate 
(Jenkins 2001). Violations of these regulations can have serious consequences for the 
viability of NPOs. Additionally, research suggests that the managers of these 
organizations often misunderstand the regulatory environment and, thus, overestimate 
the degree to which their political activity is limited by government (Berry 2003). 
Despite these constraints, however, some nonprofit organizations continue to 
participate in the policy debate. In fact, data from the National Center for Charitable 
Statistics suggest that almost a quarter engage in some type of political activity. It is this 
dimension of the confluence of the governmental and third sectors in which I am 
interested. More specifically, it is a desire to better understand the  political activity of 
nonprofit organizations within the context of their carefully regulated and sometimes 
highly dependent relationship with government that has motivated the research questions 
in this dissertation. 
Understanding the ways in which nonprofit organizations engage in the policy 
process is important for a number of reasons, not least of which is the rapid growth in 
both the size and potential political impact of the third sector in recent years. Although 
there is no exact count of the nonprofit organizations, a conservative estimate suggests 
that there were 1.2 million 501 (c)(3) and (c)(4) organizations in the 1990s (Salamon 
2002). Approximately 11 million paid employees (7% of the U.S. workforce) and 5.7 
million fulltime volunteers labor in this sector, with employment concentrated in the 
fields of health (43%), education (22%), and social services (18%). Third sector 
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revenues increased by 144% after adjusting for inflation between 1977-1997 and the 
number of 501 (c)(3) and (c)(4) organizations registered with the IRS increased by 155% 
during that same period (Salamon 2002).  
Understanding the political activity of NPOs is also important because of the 
substantive impact on politics, policy, and clients. DiMaggio and Anheier (1990) suggest 
that NPOs are sources of diversity and innovation. They increase pluralism by serving as 
organizations of influence outside of the state, which are able to provide vehicles 
through which disenfranchised groups may organize. These scholars also note the 
importance of nonprofit organizations in politically sensitive policy arenas. Salamon 
(1999) argues that NPOs provide a bridge between the failure of the market systems to 
provide collective goods and the limited ability of a democratic society to 
comprehensively address such market failures (Salamon 1999). According to the author, 
nonprofit organizations emerge to fill this gap.  
The citizens whose needs fall within this gap between what the market and 
government will produce are often the most politically, as well as economically, 
impoverished. Thus, when nonprofit organizations become politically active, it is this 
group of politically inefficacious actors whose interests they represent. Understanding 
this representation function is arguably the most important reason to study nonprofit 
advocacy, and it is the intellectual spark that has ignited most previous studies in this 
area. 
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Previous Scholarship 
There is a small but quickly growing literature investigating the political 
behavior of nonprofit organizations. Under the broad headings of collaboration, 
grassroots and direct lobbying, scholars have recognized that advocacy can include 
public education, public relations, research, mobilization efforts, agenda setting, 
lobbying, monitoring legislative or bureaucratic activity, and even participating in a 
variety of election activities (Reid 2000). The body of scholarship has studied such 
activity at different levels of government and in different policy arenas. Scholars have 
noted that the amount of advocacy activity seems to be increasing over time and that 
such activity can have meaningful influence on the behavior of legislators, as well as on 
policy outputs. 
A smaller group of studies has asked questions about NPO advocacy that are 
more directly germane to my research interests. Namely, why do some organizations 
choose to engage in political activity despite the consequences and the fact that advocacy 
is not their primary mission? In answering that question, scholars have suggested that 
NPO advocacy is a function of strategic choices by managers, the characteristics of 
institutional structures, and the nature of organizational resources.  
A strategic choice perspective on nonprofit advocacy assumes that these 
organizations are capable of adapting to and altering events in the external environment 
(Ansoff 1979; Koteen, 1989: 108-109; Ring, 1989: 67). This perspective relies heavily 
on organizational leadership as a primary explanatory factor for organizational decisions 
concerning advocacy. If organizations do not advocate, it is because the failure of 
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managers to align internal capabilities with external forces leaves them unable to counter 
environmental threats and exploit environmental opportunities (Hay 1990; Ring 1989).  
As an alternative to strategic choice an institutional perspective suggests that 
significant actors within an organization’s network such as funders, the public, state 
agencies, and professional associations, develop and enforce normative rules for 
organizational behavior. Because of the established roles of these actors in society, those 
norms tend to be relatively conservative. Close adherence to these rules increases the 
probability of survival and, thus, organizations that survive tend to be those that meet 
dominant social expectations.  
Along with strategic choice and institutional theories, there are studies that adopt 
a resource dependence explanation for nonprofit advocacy. From the resource 
dependence perspective, the dominant environmental constraint on the advocacy 
function is the threat that advocacy poses to the procurement of government funds (Cruz 
2001). A growing dependence on government funding among voluntary organizations 
may constrain advocacy activity because, as public funding becomes more central to 
organizational survival, nonprofits become more acquiescent to the demands of 
government (Wolch 1990).  
Although both institutional and resource dependence theory offer intuitively 
plausible explanations for nonprofit advocacy, this dissertation was motivated in part by 
the fact that recent research has offered little empirical support for either. Rather than 
advocacy being carried out by small and loosely organized groups with few normative 
ties to funders and professional organizations, as institutional theory would suggest, 
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Berry (2003) finds that the opposite is true. The author suggests that large organizations 
with sophisticated accounting capacity are more likely than small, less differentiated 
organizations to advocate because they can play a financial “shell game” that obscures 
the actual extent of lobbying.  
Current research also suggests that longstanding and sometimes highly dependent 
financial relationships with government do not necessarily suppress the advocacy 
function. Berry (2003) finds a mobilization effect where previous government-initiated 
contacts are an important predictor of further political activity by the nonprofit and 
suggests that other forms of dependence on government resources have little or no 
impact on the decision to lobby. Cruz (2001) offers a similar conclusion. In her study, 
NPO managers and directors whose organizations depended on governmental sources 
for much or all of their incomes were just as likely to engage in advocacy as those that 
took almost no government funding. 
A Review of This Study 
In an effort to address the inconsistent findings regarding the motivations for 
nonprofit advocacy and provide some additional insight into this important activity, I 
offer a theoretical approach which integrates previous theories within a decision-making 
framework. It argues that the decision to advocate is a strategic response to conditions in 
the policy and political environments in which NPOs deliver services and that the 
content and character of that response are highly constrained by available resources. 
Specifically, I develop the argument that nonprofit service providers decide to 
advocate when the threat from government institutions to their ability to deliver core 
  
117
services is sufficient to justify engaging in political activity and when they perceive the 
highest probability of success. Once an organization has decided to undertake some level 
of advocacy, its choice among the particular tactics for changing policy depends heavily 
on the level and nature of human and financial resources that it possesses. Because third 
sector organizations interact with external actors and depend on those actors for their 
survival I conceive of advocacy as strategy formulation in an open system.  
The argument that strategy formulation in complex and open organizations is a 
multi-stage process is borrowed from the literature on public management. Boyne and 
Walker (2004) argue that there are three levels of strategy formulation. These include the 
selection of primary missions and objectives, formulation of broad strategies to address 
environmental constraints on those objectives, and finally the selection of specific 
actions in the implementation of those strategies. 
After selecting a domain, Boyne and Walker (2004) suggest that organizations 
must assess environmental conditions to determine an appropriate Strategic Stance. This, 
according to the authors is the “broad way in which organizations seek to extract needed 
resources from the environment” (Boyne and Walker 2004, 240). When determining its 
stance, the organization interprets signals from the environment to decide on a course of 
action that ensures organizational survival and success (See also Rubin 1988). After 
setting these general goals in response to environmental conditions, Boyne and Walker 
(2004) argue that organizations must choose a set of Strategic Actions. These are, 
according to the authors, “the specific actions that organizations may use to 
operationalize their stance” (Boyne and Walker 2004, 241). In other words, once an 
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organization has decided that the environment necessitates a certain course of action 
(strategic stance), it must determine the specific activities that will help it to pursue that 
course most effectively.  
From this theoretical framework, I arrive at two separate but interrelated 
hypotheses. The first suggests that nonprofit service providers decide to advocate when 
the threat from government institutions to their ability to deliver core services is 
sufficient to justify engaging in political activity and when they perceive the highest 
probability of success. The second hypothesis argues that once an organization has 
decided to undertake some level of advocacy, the choice among the particular tactics for 
changing policy depends heavily on the level and nature of human and financial 
resources that it possesses.  
Chapter IV presents an analysis designed to test the first of these hypotheses. The 
findings from that analysis suggest that there are strong and consistent relationships 
between policy and politics and the political activity of nonprofit service providers. In 
states with more restrictive reproductive health policy environments, nonprofit 
organizations that provide these services are more likely to engage in advocacy activity. 
They have a significantly higher probability of collaborating with a 501(c)(4) or 
engaging in direct or grassroots lobbying activity in such states. They are also more 
likely to openly declare their intention to enter the political arena by designating 
themselves as an h-elector on the IRS Form 990. The findings also suggest that, even 
when controlling for the policy environment, 501(c)(3)s are more likely to do each of 
these things in states where they have a larger number of political allies.   
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The analyses presented in Chapter IV also draw into question the usefulness of 
explanations for political activity offered by previous theories of nonprofit advocacy. 
Measures of institutionalization and resource dependence prove to be inconsistent 
predictors of the probability of engaging in advocacy and the likelihood of claiming an 
h-elector designation. Interestingly, the amount of monies received by an NPO from 
governmental sources is positively correlated with the probability of advocacy, which is 
contrary to expectations generated by resource dependence theory. 
Chapter V presents a test of the second hypothesis by analyzing the factors that 
influence advocacy behavior in that subset of organizations that have made the choice to 
become politically active. The findings from that analysis suggest that there is a 
relationship between government monies and a decrease not only in the aggressiveness 
of advocacy but also in the use of multiple advocacy strategies. Interestingly, this finding 
is consistent with the expectations offered in the resource dependence literature. The 
results suggest only a tenuous relationship between institutional variables and decisions 
regarding organizational aggressiveness in the choice of advocacy strategies. 
Theoretical Contributions 
The work presented herein offers a theoretical contribution to not only the 
scholarship on nonprofit organizations, but also to the broader literature in political 
science. Political science scholars have virtually ignored 501(c)(3) organizations, 
tending to focus their research on traditional lobbying organizations. Most of this 
research has focused on Washington D.C. based organizations, which are predominantly 
501(c)(4) organizations, typically assuming that 501 (c)(3) organizations are politically 
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inactive or  ineffectual. While this dissertation cannot answer questions about the impact 
of nonprofit advocacy, it does address the assumption that NPO service providers are not 
active players in the policy process. It demonstrates that they are and that advocacy 
activity is often a direct and logical response to the policy environment in which these 
organizations exist. Given that large 501(c)(3)s in my sample spend millions of dollars 
annually in an attempt to shape those environments, it seems that political scientists that 
ignore the third sector might be ignoring a potentially large player in the policy process. 
This dissertation contributes to the literature on nonprofit organizations because 
scholars in that field have tended to focus on the constraints rather than the motivations 
for advocacy. Alternatively, I argue that, because nonprofit organizations function in an 
environment shaped in part by governmental decisions, they must pay attention to the 
political and policy environments and how the two will affect them.  In other words, 
while recognizing that organizational resources and norms may limit the ability to 
advocate, I suggest that the policy and political environments serve as the primary 
motivation for political activity among nonprofits. These organizations are not just 
passive actors in the political process, but rather are capable of actively responding to 
government actions and savvy enough to know where attempts to change policy are 
likely to be most fruitful.  
In addition to suggesting the importance of political variables for understanding 
advocacy, this dissertation may also help to clarify the mixed findings generated by 
previous theories of nonprofit advocacy. One of the main themes of this dissertation is 
that there is confusion as to the effects of institutional structures and resource 
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dependence on the decision of nonprofits to undertake advocacy activities. As an 
example, theoretical works suggest that nonprofit reliance on government funds creates a 
relationship in which nonprofit organizations will limit their advocacy role (Beck 1970), 
but recent studies have found little support for resource dependence theory (Cruz 2001; 
Berry 2003).  
One potential reason for these mixed findings is that scholars have treated 
advocacy as a monolithic strategy rather than a multi-stage decision process. 
Alternatively, this study applies the ideas of strategy formulation developed by Boyne 
and Walker (2004) and posits that advocacy is actually a two stage decision. With this 
multi-stage approach in mind, it is not surprising that a dependence on government 
resources would emerge as an important predictor in some studies and insignificant in 
others. If scholars are asking about the decision to be political, then the findings from 
this study suggest that resource dependence offers little predictive accuracy. 
Alternatively, if they are inquiring about the aggressiveness with which NPOs pursue 
such activity, the theory seems to provide substantial leverage.  
Directions for Future Research 
As is typically the case, this research invites as many questions as it answers and 
suggests that there is room for considerably more research on the topic of nonprofit 
advocacy. First and foremost, I would suggest that research should delve further into 
analyzing the role that government resources play in the decision of a nonprofit to 
participate in advocacy. My research suggests that organizations receiving more funds 
from government are more likely to be politically active, though less likely to employ 
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aggressive strategies. This may be because organizations that receive government 
funding have a vested interest in agitating enough to ensure that the money keeps 
flowing, but are, at the same time, cautious not to engage in political activity that could 
jeopardize lucrative relationships with government. Testing the veracity of this assertion 
could help to add considerably more nuance to predictions about the relationship 
between resource dependence and nonprofit advocacy. 
An additional avenue for research arises out of authors’ assertions that politically 
savvy nonprofit organizations are capable of playing a financial shell game by diverting 
fungible resources into advocacy type activities. Many organizations readily admit that 
they provide certain services that are not direct or grassroots lobbying, but that 
researchers in the field would most likely classify as advocacy. An in-depth survey and 
additional analysis of the IRS Form 990, would provide additional information on these 
types of activities and should be the next step in understanding how politically active 
NPOs attempt to benefit clients and influence policy. 
While nonprofit organizations are limited in their ability to lobby both as a 
grassroots effort and directly influencing legislators, they are not limited in their ability 
to lobby or monitor bureaucracies. Scholars have long recognized that bureaucratic 
actors enjoy significant discretion and exercise substantial influence in the 
implementation of policy. More recent work has also demonstrated that bureaucratic 
agencies have a meaningful impact on policy formulation as well. Thus, understanding 
how nonprofit organizations interact with these agencies could contribute to our 
understanding of both policy outcomes and outputs.  
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